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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Problem Statement: Theoretical Background and Justification of the Research
Reports of conflicts fill the news media. Conflicts, by their very nature, always attract
massive media attention. Past research has pointed out that conflict reporting is often
sensationalized for the sake of boosting circulation and ratings (Lee & Maslog, 2005). Since
conflicting parties always attempt to use the news media to gain legitimacy and public support,
conflict reporting can also involve political and ideological purposes. Yet, Arno (1984) notified
that the media content does not merely reflect the level of conflict but has a functional
relationship to it: the news media are themselves actors in the conflict situations they report. Put
another way, they are participants in the conflict as a third party. In many cases, the media actor
is seen as a beneficiary of conflict situations by stimulating interest and readership (Arno 1984;
Simmel 1950).
When it comes to international conflicts, Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) suggested a
more active role for the press, in which it either intensifies or diminishes the conflict. During
times of international conflicts, many media professionals strive to maintain journalistic norms
and values such as the search for objectivity, fact-based reporting and neutrality, while some
others advocate that the media should play a more significant role in defusing tensions and
forging peace. At the same time, it is noticeable that the ingredients of war such as nationalism,
national interest, anger, censorship and propaganda often conspire to prevent objective reporting
(Ting Lee & Maslog, 2002). In other words, many news organizations function as a propaganda
tool and an advocate for the perceived national interest of the system of which they are a part.
Such third-party functions may present a professional dilemma between the traditional
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journalism ethics code and the journalist‟s patriotic and nationalistic sentiments, and their ethnic
and cultural identity (Loyn, 2007; McGoldrick, 2006; Zandberg & Neiger, 2005). When
journalists are caught between nation and profession like that, the contradictory interests
involved might discredit the news media as a credible source of information.
The present study analyzes the role of nationalism and professionalism in the coverage of
the conflict over the South China Sea (SCS) in English language papers of the three contending
countries of China, Vietnam and the Philippines in June and July, 2011. During this period, the
conflict among these countries was at a peak with verbal skirmishes and the region‟s security
situation was deteriorating in a way unseen since the mid-1990s (Lohman, 2011). Schofield and
Storey (2011) stressed that risks were growing that the sea dispute could lead to war, potentially
drawing in the United States and other major world powers. As such, coverage of the New York
Times, which is generally considered to be one of the most influential American newspapers, is
also analyzed for the sake of comparison and in order to understand the perspective of
international observers.
News coverage of the SCS conflict, important and multifaceted in global implications,
lends itself particularly well to the analysis of the above-mentioned journalistic clashes.
Therefore, this study is intended to function as a cross-cultural case study exploring the practice
of journalists during multi-national conflicts. Moreover, as the news media play a significant role
in the process of constructing public understanding, through collecting, framing and distributing
information, understanding the role of the involved media systems in this particular international
conflict is crucial to the prospects of preserving peace and security of both the South East Asian
region and the world.

2

Organization of the Study
Following this introductory first chapter, the second chapter presents brief background
information on the current conflict in the South China Sea. The chapter clarifies why the study
focuses only on China, Vietnam, and the Philippines among the six states involved (i.e., China,
Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Taiwan). The third chapter summarizes what is
to be achieved by the study, specifies the research problems, poses research questions and states
the research methodology. Then the fourth chapter focuses on journalistic objectivity, discussing
such factors as gate-keeping, news values and agenda-setting in detail. It also explores the
relationship between nationalism and news objectivity as well as examining the war journalism
frame. Characteristics of the news media under study are also discussed in this chapter. The
collected data are processed and evaluated in the fifth chapter. Finally, chapter six wraps up the
study with some concluding analysis, remarks and suggestions.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT

Figure 1. The South China Sea and disputed claimants. Adapted from “South China Sea,” by
U.S. Department of Energy, 2008.
The South China Sea (SCS) is part of the Pacific Ocean and an extremely significant
body of water in a geo-political sense. It borders China and Taiwan to the north and is known by
Chinese as the South Sea. It borders Vietnam to the West and thus is called the East Sea by
Vietnamese. Similarly, it borders the Philippines to the east and is officially referred by the
Philippine government as the West Philippines Sea. It also borders Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia
and Singapore to the south and southwest. As its sea-lane is by far the shortest route from the
4

North Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean, SCS is the second most used sea route in the world.
Over half of the world‟s petroleum-bearing traffic passes through its waters. Over half of the
tonnage shipped through the sea is crude oil from the Gulf to East Asia. Japan imports 80 per
cent of its oil over these sea routes. Furthermore, these sea lanes in Southeast Asia have a critical
economic and naval importance to outside maritime powers such as the United States or Japan.
Meanwhile, four of the 16 strategic straits in the world, which are important to the mobility of
the U.S. submarine fleet in reaching target areas, are in Southeast Asia. Besides its rich fishery
resources, the area holds large deposits of oil and gas.
The SCS conflict has been ranked at the top of the list of the Southeast Asia‟s hot spots
for decades (Cosa, 1998). The lingering territorial dispute involves five countries: China,
Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia. Taiwan, which functions as if it were an
independent nation though its status is in dispute, is also a claimant in this dispute.
Basically, the conflict concerns the ownership of the Paracels1 and Spratlys2, the two
island groups consisting of some 200 mid-ocean islets in the SCS, most of which are coral
outcroppings without any permanent human habitation. The two island groups are not of much
value in themselves, but all the countries have claimed the two as inviolable parts of the sacred

1

The Paracels are located approximately 200 nautical miles due east of Vietnam‟ south central
coastal city of Danang and about one-third of the way from central Vietnam to the northern
Philippines (CIA World Factbook for Paracel Islands).
2
The Spratlys constitute at least 190 barren islets and partially submerged reefs and rocks
covering an approximately 150,000 square mile area. Exact counts vary widely, in part because
many are often or almost always under water. The Spratlys are located about 300 miles off the
Vietnamese coast and 600 miles southeast of the Chinese island of Hainan. The Philippine island
of Palawan is 50-90 miles to the east and the Malaysian state of Sabah and country of Brunei are
160 miles to the south. The Spratlys are geologically separated from the continental shelves of
China and Taiwan by a 3,000-meter trench to the north, and from the Philippines, Brunei, and
Malaysia by the East Palawan Trough. The area is poorly surveyed and marked as "Dangerous
Ground" on navigation charts (Cosa, 1998).
5

national soil due to the expectation that the owner(s) could benefit from the natural resources
from the offshore waters of the islets (Cosa, 1998; Park, 2009; Storey, 1999; Tonnesson, 2000).
Vietnam and China claim the entire islands, reefs and rocks in the main Spratly
archipelago that stands or emerges above sea level, while the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei
claim some parts. The Philippines also claims the islets within a slightly more limited area called
Kalayaan. Malaysia claims seven islets in the Southern Spratlys because they fall within its
continental self-boundary. Brunei is the only claimant which does not occupy any islets to
support its claims. Its claim takes the form of a corridor extending 200 nautical miles from its
coast. Among the six claimants, Vietnam, China and the Philippines are the three most vocal
parties in the dispute. Apart from fish and oil resources, Valencia (1997) pointed out that the
contested waters also have a strategic function for sea-lane defense, interdiction and surveillance.
Therefore, the three countries have tended to see the conflict as a competitive quest for
sovereignty, particularly Vietnam and China (Park, 2009; Tonesson, 2000). The disputed sea has
long been perceived as “analogous to land, and the delineation of maritime zones has thus been
discussed with the same terms as those used for delineating land borders” (Tonesson, 2000,
p.200). Both China and Vietnam have incorporated the whole Spratly archipelago into their
provincial administrative systems, and the Philippines has done the same for Kalayaan. This led
to the use of military force in the past, both to enforce and expand national claims, and could be
escalated into a war with far-reaching disastrous consequences. Also, these three claimants have
tried to bolster their claims in many other ways: allowing tourists and journalists to visit "their"
islands, and granting concessions to oil companies.
Also, free navigation of warships and submarines through and under the straits and sea
lanes of Southeast Asia is crucial to the strategy of the United States and a matter of the U.S.
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national security interest (Valencia, 1997). Consequently, the SCS conflict raises concern over
freedom of navigation issues among members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN).
As the claims are overlapping, a brief review of claims of China, Vietnam and the
Philippines follows:
Vietnam
The Vietnamese present historical and archaeological evidences to bolster their claims,
arguing that the Vietnamese have conducted commercial activities on and around the Paracels
(Hoang sa) since the 15th century. In 1816, the Vietnamese Emperor Gia Long officially claimed
the sovereignty of the Paracel Islands, which would include the present-day Spratly archipelago.
These two islands were later delineated distinctly under the reign of his successor. French troops
attacked Vietnam (Annam in French) in 1858, and turned the country into a French colony in
1887. In 1930, France claimed the islands on behalf of its protected state (Vietnam), based on
the fact that Emperor Gia Long had officially taken possession of the Paracels Islands. In 1932,
the French Indochina and the Nguyen Dynasty of Vietnam announced the formal occupation and
annexation of nine Spartly islands, and set up a weather station on Pattle Island (Tonnesson,
2006). Vietnam reaffirmed its sovereignty over the Spartlys and Paracels when it gained
independence from France in 1945. In 1951, Vietnam asserted its claim to all the Spratlys. In
1956, after the French withdrawal, South Vietnam replaced the French to have control of the
islands and reasserted the claim in 1956. From 1961, South Vietnam issued decrees covering the
administration of the two groups of islands as part of Vietnamese territory. In 1974, a bloody
battle occurred between China and South Vietnam. In 1975, Vietnam was united and the new
Socialist Republic of Vietnam reasserted Vietnam's positions in the Spratlys and Paracels area.
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In 1988, China managed to get a foothold in the Spratlys after another bloody naval forces clash
with Vietnam (Burgess, 2003; Cosa, 1998; Nguyen, 2000; Park, 2009; Storrey, 1999; Tonnesson,
2006). Since then, Vietnam has continuously lodged diplomatic protests against China‟s claim.
Currently, Vietnam occupies more of the Spratlys islands than any of the other contesting states.
China
China's claim is based on the grounds of discovery and occupation originating with the
Han Dynasty (206 B.C. to 220 A.D.) and the use of the SCS by Chinese fishermen since then
(Cosa, 1998; Storrey, 1999). The first official claim by China dated from an 1887 treaty with
France dividing the Gulf of Tonkin between the French colony of Vietnam (Annam) and China.
China interprets this treaty as extending south beyond the Tonkin Gulf to include all the islands
of the SCS (Cosa, 1998). In 1948, the Kuomintang government of the Republic of China issued a
map of locations of the SCS depicting its claim as a broken, U-shaped line that intersects waters
off Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines (Cosa, 1998; Storey, 1999; Tonnesson,
2006). After the Communist Party of China took over power and formed the People‟s Republic
of China (PRC) in 1949, the map was adopted and revised by Zhou Enlai. To back up their
arguments, both China and Taiwan still cite this U-shaped claim, although no official
declarations defining the nature or extent of the claim have been made. Official Chinese maps
include the U-shaped line, also without elaboration (Burgess, 2003; Cosa, 1998; Nguyen, 2000;
Park, 2009; Storrey, 1999; Tonnesson, 2006).
In 1958, China issued a "Declaration of Territorial Sea" that extended China's territorial
waters to 12 nautical miles and claimed the territory of the Spratly (Nansha) Islands, Taiwan, the
Paracels, Macclesfield Bank, and the Pescadores. In 1992, China's "Law on the Territorial
Waters and their Contiguous Areas" added 24 nautical miles Contiguous Zones, and reiterated
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the claims of the 1958 Declaration. It additionally claimed the Senkaku islands east of Taiwan
(which are in dispute with Japan). China also authorized the use of military force in defending
these claims.
China invaded and seized the Paracels from South Vietnam in 1974. The first PRC
occupation of the Spratlys occurred in 1988 in a naval battle in which there Vietnamese vessels
were sunk and 72 Vietnamese soldiers were killed. China took possession of several reefs in the
Spratlys and established a base at Fiery Cross Reef. Since then, other reefs have also been
occupied. Of most recent and greatest immediate contention were the emplacement of markers
and the construction of "fisherman's structures" on the Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef in early
1995.
After taking possession of several additional reefs in the Spratlys and establishing a base,
China has advanced in occupying other reefs. Currently, China has extended its claim to all the
SCS‟s islands, although it has yet to clearly delineate the claim (Burgess, 2003; Cosa, 1998;
Nguyen, 2000; Park, 2009; Storrey, 1999; Tonnesson, 2006).
The Philippines
Among the three conflicting parties, the Philippines‟ claim is much more recent. The
country bases its claim to the SCS on the grounds of the definition of exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) under the provision of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS)3. The Philippines files its claim over what it calls the Kalayaan Islands on their

3

In 1982, a long-awaited convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS) was adopted at a United
Nations conference. This sets down rules for measuring maritime zones and contains guidelines
for mediation and settlement of disputes. In brief, the LOS Convention established parameters
for defining a territorial sea, a contiguous zone, an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and a
continental shelf, and it specified terms for deciding what is and what is not an island, as well as
the criteria to be met in order for an island to generate a maritime zone beyond a 12-nauticalmile territorial sea. Four areas covered by the convention are relevant for the SCS context.
9

proximity to Philippine territory and on the occupation and economic development of these
previously "unattached and unused" islands by Filipino civilian settlers. The country argues that
the Kalayaan Islands are a separate island chain from the Spratlys and its claim overlaps those of
China (Taiwan), Malaysia, and Vietnam.
Philippine forces began to occupy some of the Kalayaan islands in 1968. In 1971 the
Philippines officially claimed the islands, stating that any other claims to the area had lapsed by
being abandoned. In 1978, the Kalayaans were formally annexed by Presidential decree. The
Philippines government has stated that the islands are important for national security and
economic survival due to their proximity to the main Philippine islands. The Philippines
government alleges that ancient Chinese claims are invalid since these claims also included parts
of what today are the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Further, Chinese fishermen in
ancient times only used the islands as a temporary base of operations (Cosa, 1998; Nguyen,
2000; Storrey, 2009). Since 1995, China and the Philippines have been involved in a serious
conflict over the Mischief Reef, which is in the eastern part of the Spratlys. While Philippine
troops arrested people on Chinese fishing boats and Chinese citizens near the conflict area, China
demanded their release and warned that it does not have limitless tolerance for encroachments on
China's sovereignty and dignity, and that the other side must bear full responsibility for any
serious consequences (Valencia, 1997). Like Vietnam and other claimants, the Philippines rejects

Article 3 asserts that every state has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a
limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles‟. Articles 55–75 define the concept of an EEZ, an area up
to 200 nautical miles beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea. Within its EEZ, a nation
possesses sovereign rights „for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and
managing the natural resources‟ of the area. Articles 76–77 define the notion of a continental
shelf and accord nations that have a continental shelf „sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring it and exploiting its natural resources‟. Article 121 specifies that „rocks that cannot
sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no EEZ or continental shelf‟.
10

China‟s nine-dotted line claim, citing that it is baseless and against the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
The On-Going Dispute
Since the bloody clash between China and Vietnam in 1988 and after the Philippines's
protest against China's creeping constructions on the Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef in 1995,
all claimants have expressed a desire to settle the dispute peacefully. Yet, frequent flare-ups,
mutual suspicions, distrust and political grandstanding still remain in this maritime region. Since
energy insecurity is rising in this developing region, Vietnam, China and Philippines all are
pushing to develop oil and gas exploration projects in the SCS waters, which is said to contain
enough oil and gas to rival Saudi Arabia's reserves4.
The most recent and greatest immediate contention spiked up after a Chinese patrol boat
cut cables from a Vietnamese ship doing seismic surveys off its southern coast on May 28, 2011.
A similar incident occurred on June 9, 2011 when a Chinese patrol boat slashed a submerged
cable of a Vietnamese oil exploratory vessel operated by Petro Vietnam, the state energy firm.
The second incident happened just four days after the Chinese Minister of Defense Liang
Guanglie had attempted to reassure delegates regarding China's intentions at the Shangri-La
Dialogue5 in Singapore. This spate of incidents between the Chinese and Vietnamese vessels in
the disputed sea has not only fueled serious tension between the communist neighbors but also
put the dispute on center stage of the world's politics. In response to the incidents, Vietnam
conducted a live-fire naval drill off its coastal waters in the SCS on June 13, 2011. On the same
4

According to a U.S. Energy Information Administration report, those claims have yet to be
proven. Still, there are enough proven wells in the South China Sea to tantalize the players,
which explains why oil and gas survey vessels are at the heart of the recent incidents.
(http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/06/25/south.china.sea.conflict/index.html)
5
The annual Shangri-La Dialogue focuses on regional co-operation, peace and harmony,
particularly among ASEAN members.
11

day, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung signed a bill clarifying eligibility for military
conscription, which could lead to the call up of five million additional troops (Santolan, 2011).
Vietnam is not the only nation skirmishing with Chinese patrol boats. The Philippines
also had reported Chinese boats cutting the cables of a survey ship and threatening to ram its
boats in March and May, 2011. In the midst of escalating tensions between the two communist
neighbors, the Philippine government reported that Chinese navy boats had erected pillars and
set materials near Amy Douglas Bank inside the Philippines‟ EEZ. In response, the Philippine
legislature passed a bill renaming the SCS as the "West Philippine Sea". As such, all Philippine
government statements have now referred to the disputed waters by this new name.
The tense atmosphere has sparked nationalist demonstrations in all the three countries
and a war of words at the highest levels among the three. This time, the tension further includes
the United States, which claimed to have an interest in freedom of navigation in the contested sea
at the ASEAN Regional Forum held in Hanoi a year earlier. Towsend-Gault (1999) suggested
that ASEAN wants a U.S. presence to counter China and its mercantilist approach. Although the
United States is not committed to any of the claimants, the presence of U.S. ships and aircraft in
the vicinity is generally believed to have had a stabilizing effect. The United States encourages
other claimants to support internationalization of the issue, and calls for the settlement of
disputed claims by international laws.
The U.S. standpoint has been embraced by both Vietnam and the Philippines. The
Vietnamese foreign ministry declared its strong support for the efforts by the United States and
other nations to help resolve this maritime conflict. Similarly, the Philippine government urged
military intervention from the United States in the event of armed conflict with China, based on
the two countries‟ 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. This frustrated Beijing and the Chinese reacted
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very strongly. The Chinese Foreign Ministry criticized the American intervention as „an attack
on China,‟ and has recently issued a veiled warning to the United States to keep out of the
dispute.
But why invoke the role of the news media in this international conflict? Caught in a
dilemma between national desire for solidarity and professional desire for objectivity, the news
media are either blamed for assisting in stoking up nationalist sentiment and war propaganda or
putting ratings and circulation ahead of national welfare (Ciorciari & Weiss; 2012). Put another
way, the media practitioners are charged with either lack of responsible professionalism or of
excessive patriotism.

13



May 28: A Chinese patrol boat cut cables from a Vietnamese ship doing seismic

surveys off its Southern coast.


June 1: The Philippines reported that Chinese navy boats erected pillars and set

unloaded materials near Amy Douglas Bank inside the Philippines‟ EEZ


June 8: China steps up its criticism of the Philippines, calling on Manila to stop

infringing its sovereignty with claims over the SCS


June 9: A Chinese patrol boat slashed a submerged cable if a Vietnamese oil

exploratory vessel operated by the Vietnam‟s state energy firm


June 12: Anti-China rallies in HCM City and Hanoi (Vietnam)



June 13: Vietnam conducted a live-fire naval drill off its coastal waters in SCS



June 18: The U.S. and Vietnam jointly call for freedom of navigation in the SCS



June 23: The Philippines officially claimed that it expected the U.S. military

support in the face of rising friction with China


June 25: The US calls for China to cool tensions over the disputed territory. China

rejects this call, telling the US to stay out of its regional dispute


July 11: American and Chinese military chiefs argue about US exercises in the

SCS; Chinese army chief says the US military exercises with the Philippines and Vietnam were
"extremely inappropriate”.


July 13: The Philippines states that China's refusal to allow a UN-backed tribunal

to rule on the territorial dispute indicates that Beijing's claim stands on illegal ground


July 14: Armed Chinese soldiers allegedly beat a Vietnamese fisherman and

threaten other crew members before driving them out of waters near the contested Paracel
Islands


July 19: The Philippines sent 5 congressmen to the disputed Spratly Islands to

support its territorial claims; China says the trip "serves no purpose but to undermine peace and
stability in the region and sabotage the China-Philippines relationship
Figure 2. Timeline of the dispute from May 28, 2011 to July 30, 2011
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CHAPTER III
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The study functions as a cross-cultural case study analysis to explore the practice of
journalists during a multi-national conflict. It examines factors that influence journalists and
news organizations as they attempt to report on an international conflict of which their country is
a party, seeking answer to the question why war journalism continue to persist.
Research Questions
The present study proceeds using a theoretical framework grounded in the theory of
journalistic objectivity, gate-keeping, agenda-setting, nationalism and news framing. Its main
research question focuses on whether reporting in the countries under study is characterized by
extreme nationalism and bias rather than objectivity. The answer to this question is of critical
importance, as misleading information and aggressive reporting will create an "enemy" image
among the nations‟ peoples or could eventually lead to armed conflict.
In order to answer the main research question, other questions or issues to be examined
are these:
RQ1: Which country‟s media gives more coverage to the conflict? (e.g., Vietnam,
Philippines, China, or international news organizations)
RQ2: What types of articles or coverage are used more frequently? Hard news reports,
features, editorials, or others (e.g., letters to the editors, picture gallery...etc.)?
RQ3: Do the studied mainstream media outlets serve as mouthpieces of the political
elite?
RQ4: Has the media discourse on the SCS conflict been predominantly guided towards
war journalism?
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RQ5: Which newspaper is identified as more titled towards war journalism?
RQ6: In the overall coverage, which country got more unfavorable coverage and was
framed as aggressors?
RQ7: Is reporting in the countries under study characterized by extreme nationalism and
bias rather than objectivity?
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CHAPTER IV
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Journalistic Objectivity
Although the concept of objectivity was only developed at the time of urbanization,
industrialization and the advent of consumerism (Foreman, 2010; McGoldrick, 2006), using
objectivity to get a version of the truth is one of the most recognized traditional journalistic
methods. Journalists have been long aware of the extreme importance of fairness, the ethic of
restraining their own biases and the idea that journalism should not be the voice of any particular
party or sect (Rosen, 1994). As such, journalistic objectivity has been defined as an effort to
report the facts without developing or at least without revealing an opinion about them (Kinsey,
2001). The journalists‟ view of their profession originates from what Schudson (1978) referred to
as “the neutral model” in which the professionals see their job as quasi-scientific. This means
journalists should report in an objective and balanced manner, with no obligation to any outside
interest. They should be loyal to the truth and public interest (Carrey, 2002; Loyn, 2007;
McGoldrick, 2006; Zandberg & Neiger, 2005). Objectivity and professionalism have long been
intertwined, even mutually defined, although pure objectivity is difficult to attain.
Reality. Yet, although the objective model is still a dominant journalistic value for most
journalists world-wide, criteria for an objective news report remain controversial.

Schiller

pointed out that news exemplifies values and "if a news net is indeed thrown virtually round the
world, it is woven in such a way as to harvest only some species of fish" (1981, p.1). Thus, all
news is declared to be selective and the result of a myriad of daily decisions, judgments and
routine organizational and institutional constraints. Hughes (1940, 1942) suggested that the news
depends on the point of view of the reporter who writes it, whereas the reporter's viewpoint
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originated from the job itself, the nature of his/her assignment, and the character of his/her
newspaper. Also, Hughes argued that the beats the newspaper covers, and the reporters who
cover them are all subject to both institutional changes outside and within the newsroom. In other
words, there is an invisible frame bracketing news reports as a particular kind of public
knowledge and a key category in popular epistemology. Moreover, as Starkey (2007) noted, one
person's balance may be another person's bias, particularly if they have extremely different
perspectives. Therefore, what seems to be objective to one person may be considered highly
subjective by another. In short, researchers argue that despite the importance of objectivity in
journalism ethics and standards, neither objectivity nor impartiality exists in practice.
Those arguing the issue point out that the news media routinely present images and
descriptions that are partial, as opposed to complete. This is believed to be caused by the news
media's inability to recreate any original experiment of the world, but only relatively limited
detail (Starkey, 2007). Even with live broadcasts, the news audience still witnesses live events by
proxy. Although the audience may choose to view what they are shown, read what is reported
and hear what is played to them, they are not at the scene. Since representation is only a partial
account of a place, an event or an issue, it necessarily involves choices being made over what is
included and what is not. Consequently, it is reporters who are the ones choosing how to present
(or represent) the real life experience of being there. Although journalists rarely draw their
readers' attention to the incompleteness of their reporting, each news story is a construct formed
from elements chosen to offer the readers an insight into a “reality" in which they are supposedly
interested. Therefore, the chances of these being wholly accurate representations are very low
(Hughes, 1942; Starkey, 2007). Schiller (1981) noted that even if unintentional, representing
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reality within the time and resource constraints all media face can introduce distortions that
becloud more than they illuminate.
McQuail (1992) suggested four different kinds of bias: partisan, propaganda, unwitting,
and ideological. The first is explicit support for a particular position and the second more
implicit, which is only apparent to those who are sensitive to the value-laden nature of the
comment, descriptions and attitudes in the reporting. Unwitting bias results from the physical
constraints of the news profession: there is so much room in a newspaper or time in a bulletin.
Finally, since ideological bias is rooted in the reporters' own perceptions and attitudes, values
and beliefs, it may not even be apparent to those who produce it.
In fact, a representation that is selective might still be widely considered fair if competing
perspectives are balanced in such a way that none of them gain any advantage from the act of
mediation taking place (Starkey, 2007). Presenting a balanced account would normally require
impartiality, or at least adopting an objective, rather than a subjective position and remaining true
to it. In other words, telling it like it is. Being objective now means not placing undue emphasis
on one part of a representation, in order to distort it, for whatever motive. This means objectivity
implies detachment from an issue, or at least, representing it in as "balanced" a way as could be
achieved by someone without a vested interest in it. As such, a high degree of news objectivity is
still relatively achievable.
News constructing: gatekeeping and news values. Lyon (2007) defined news as what
matters, what gets into the political bloodstream and what counts. As discussed earlier, to
imagine that the content of a news report accurately reflects all that has happened during
important events to the target audience is to grossly underestimate the role of journalists in
constructing the news. Despite its relative objectivity, journalism is still a “subjective art” as its
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practitioners are the decision-makers (Foreman 2009, p. 63). They are the ones who are often in
charge of deciding which issues deserve prominent display and which issues are to be ignored.
They make decisions about the news: what facts to use, what facts to highlight in the story and
what facts to skip. In other words, news does not spring out of nowhere and each decision is seen
as an opportunity for opinions to step in (Foreman, 2009). Also, journalism can be driven by
other factors, such as newsroom culture, sensitivities towards advertisers, pressure groups, varied
sources, or even seem-to-be mediocre facts like

"not putting audiences off their dinner"

(Sheridan, 2002, p. 10). For instance, most journalists apply their own particular news values to
the prioritization of stories and some newspapers tend to prioritize the compelling nature of bad
news over good news. Thus, constructing news is a much more complex process than a simple,
linear relationship between an information producer and an information consumer.
In such a complex world of media framing, gate-keeping has been widely used as a term
to describe the procedure of news selection, especially decisions regarding whether or not to
allow particular news report to pass through the gates of a news medium into the news channel
(McQuail, 2005; Shoemaker, 2001;White, 1950). If an event is perceived by the decision makers
to be important, it will pass through the gate. Watson (2007) identified that the news-gate might
swing shut, open, sometimes wide-open, or sometimes slightly open, but there is usually more
than one who gate-keeps. He noted that the selection process not only operates at the gate. In
other words, mediation takes place at every possible stage between events and transmission. In
effect, anything along the communication chain can affect what does or does not appear in the
media as gatekeepers.
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Figure 3. Simple Gate-keeping Model. Adapted from " The Gate-Keeper: A Case Study
in the Selection of News", by D.M. White, 1950, Journalism Quarterly, 27, p.386.
But what qualifies for admission and who makes the decisions? The regular answer is
that "people who gather and transmit the news are doing it every day of their working lives: they
are professionals, they know what news is" (Watson, 2007, p. 111). Galtung and Ruge (1995)
introduced the model of selective gate-keeping, attempting to rationalize the various levels of
selection between the original event and its representation. They suggested that news from
around the world is evaluated by using news-values, which are those attributes of a news event
transforming it into an interesting story for an audience, to determine its newsworthiness. The
researchers categorized news values into three types that influence the selection: including
organizational, genre-related, and socio-cultural. The organizational factors are most universal,
least escapable and have some ideological consequences.
Undoubtedly, the final news content of the news media arrives by several different routes
and in different forms. This means it might have to be sought out or ordered in advance, or even
have to be systematically planned. Sometimes, it is also forced to be internally constructed or
manufactured. Similar to the procedure of news selection, such a process of news construction is
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neither random nor objective. McQuail (2005) explained that it occurs largely due to schemes of
interpretation and of relevance which are those of the bureaucratic institutions which either are
news sources or processes events, for instance, police departments, government officials, courts,
etc. Similarly, Fishman (1982) suggested that what is known and knowable by the press depends
on the information-gathering and information-processing resources of these agencies. The main
factors that influence the final choice can be considered under the headings of people, place,
time, or usually in combination of all. Put another way, the collection of news has to be
organized and there is bias towards events and news stories that fit the machinery of selection
and retransmission (McQuail, 2005). Genre-related factors include a preference for news events
that fit advance audience expectation, and can be easily placed within a familiar interpretative
frame; for instance, frames of conflict. Finally, the social-cultural influence on news selection is
originated from certain western values that focus on individuals and involve an interest in elite
people, negative, violent and dramatic happenings.

Figure 4. Selective Gate-keeping Theory by Galtung and Ruge (1965). Adapted from
Communication Models for the Study of Mass Communications (p.166), by D. Mc Quail and S.
Windahl, 1993, London: Longman.
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Agenda setting: the public and the national agenda. The application of news values
not only results in the prioritization of some stories over others, but also determines the extent of
coverage, as well as what is included in the stories. Since agenda-setting is a type of social
learning, individuals learn how concerned they should be through the amount of coverage the
issues receive in the news media. News coverage, therefore, gives salience cues to the members
of the public, showing them which issues are important. The public receives these prominent
cues and ultimately believes that the issues receiving extensive coverage are more important than
those receiving little coverage (Wanta, 1997). Moreover, emphasis by the media, over time on a
relatively small numbers of issues, leads the public into perceiving these issues as more
important than other issues. The more an issue gets covered, the more it will be perceived as
being important by members of the public (see Figure 5).

Figure 5. Model of the agenda setting theory, which simply states that, the issues
given most attention by the media, will be perceived as the most important. Adapted from
Communication Models for the Study of Mass Communications (p.166), by D. Mc Quail and S.
Windahl, 1993, London: Longman.
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Regarding this agenda-setting effect, Vasterman (2004) coined the term "media hype"
to refer to a media generated, wall-to-wall news wave, which is triggered by one specific event
and expanded by the self-reinforcing processes within the news production of the media. Put
another way, since mass media are so pervasive, exposure levels are relative high for all
individuals, and such heavy media exposure has the tendency to provoke reactions from social
actors that in turn generate more news.
As such, on the surface, the agenda-setting hypothesis seems to be very simple. Yet,
when pushing to examine how agendas come about, that is, who decides what goes on to the
agenda and who prioritizes items on that agenda, the hypothesis is no longer straightforward.
There is evidence of the existence of hidden agendas; in other words, the shadowy frames of
authority and power (Watson, 2007), because news selection cannot be made arbitrarily, and
journalism does not exist in a vacuum. Resource and institutional pressures will have an impact
upon news selection. The determination of an event's news values and significance cannot be
value free. Although the news media filter and shape news, and journalists may be able to choose
what issues and events they will cover, and how perhaps how they will cover them, those in the
media are rarely completely free to always do as they please. In some cases, they are also subject
to external regulation, which can be imposed by legislation that constrains expression in a
number of respects (Starkey, 2007). Moreover, as Wanta (1997) pointed out, newspapers have
often been perceived, by publishers and their audiences alike, as both political tools and a
medium for political conflict. Thus, public officials and politicians are identified as among
important sources for news stories. Obviously, these same public officials can potentially
influence the agenda of issues that the news media cover.
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As individuals have a wide range of opinions about the news media, media credibility
also plays a significant role in agenda setting. Some people perceive the news media as biased
and blame journalists for trying to influence public opinion. Others think reporters do a
competent job of informing society of daily events. Media credibility has become even more
important to agenda setting because members of the public are increasingly doubting the
trustworthiness of the media generally and newspapers generally (Foreman, 2010). Thus,
attitudes towards the source of a message can determine the message's effectiveness. The higher
credibility of a news source, the more likely an individual will think that the information is
credible. Credible information will also be processed more efficiently and carefully by
individuals, and thus, have a stronger impact on an individual than information from an
untrustworthy source. Therefore, Wanta (1997) concluded that if individuals view the news
media to be highly credible, there will be stronger agenda-setting effects.
The State and the News Media
Bennett et al. (2006) state that journalists tend to represent political issues from the
perspectives of those in power. This means that while there may be various viewpoints
reproduced in the news, journalists tend to rely on government officials' perspectives and rarely
give the voices of dissent space in mainstream dialogue. In other words, the ones outside the
state system, and the ones without power, are unable to make their voices heard, unless they
become helpless victims of disaster. In short, governments are the news media's most important
social actors, and speak through the media as a matter of course.
Many journalism studies have pointed out that the news media often fail to frame issues
and events independently: journalists “simply pass along to the public the frames originated by
powerful political actors” (Lawrence, 2010, p. 265). Lawrence extended the argument by stating
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that “the media‟s independence in crafting news frames varies across political context” (2010, p.
266). Past research cited three major contexts: (1) news about foreign policy and national
security, particularly in high-stakes contexts of war and international conflict, (2) news about
domestic policy, particularly pertaining to social issues, and (3) news about electoral campaigns
(Lawrence, 2010, p. 267). Among the three, the foreign policy and national security context is
the one in which the mainstream media generally show less independence in framing issues and
events. Instead, journalists and media professionals tend to rely heavily on high government
officials to frame the news. A reluctance to challenge government officials in times of perceived
international crisis is a prominent feature in this context as foreign affairs, particularly issues
touching on national security, raise questions of patriotism for journalists and officials that are
not usually present in domestic affairs (Althaus, 2003; Etman, 2004; Lawrence, 2010).
Cook goes so far to argue that the news media are, in fact, "governmental institutions"
(1991, p. 18). He suggested that state and media exist in a symbiotic relationship within which
the state provides information and the news organizations decide whether or not to print or
broadcast it. He maintained that the news media need government officials to help them achieve
their job, and politicians obviously find the media central to getting done what they want to get
done. Thus, the news media is said to operate not only as a way of informing the public, but also
as a method of sharing information within the elite group. Since the government relies on the
news media as a way of communicating within itself and within the elite establishment, it is a
government's strategy to use the media to put its policies into effect. As Cook notes, the
government can use the media to criticize another country over its policies and actions, or to
place an issue on the agenda. The news media, in turn, depends on the government as a credible
source of information.
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As discussed earlier, gate-keeping and news values play a significant role in constructing
news. Very often, journalists judge the utility of information by the news sources rather than the
news content. For instance, an authoritative source is most likely an individual given a leading
role in the narrative of that news story. The information provided by someone in an official role
within the government hierarchy tends to be treated with the credibility of his/her position within
the hierarchy and/or his involvement in the decision-making process. Meanwhile, even if saying
the same thing, that same person who is outside the government hierarchy would be more likely
to be seen as providing speculation or hearsay (Cook, 1991). Scannel (1989) similarly argued
that the news media often act as a kind of "bulletin board" for the state, though this is not always
the case. Scannel (1989) concluded that only those in public life have the priority to speak their
views and opinions.
As discussed earlier, gate-keeping and news values play a significant role in constructing
news. Very often, journalists judge the utility of information by the news sources rather than the
news content. For instance, an authoritative source is most likely an individual given a leading
role in the narrative of that newsbeat. The information provided by someone in an official role
within the government hierarchy tends to be treated with the credibility of his/her position within
the hierarchy and/or his involvement in the decision-making process. Meanwhile, even if saying
the same thing, that same person who is outside the government hierarchy would be more likely
to be seen as providing speculation or hearsay (Cook, 1991). Scannel (1989) similarly argued
that the news media often act as a kind of "bulletin board" for the state, though this is not always
the case. As such, the ones outside the state system, and the ones without power, are unable to
make their voices heard, unless they become helpless victims of disaster. Scannel (1989)
concluded that only those in public life have the priority to speak up their views and opinions.
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Splichal (1991) argued that, ethically speaking, the news media should be responsible to the
public, not to the state. They cannot be seen in simple terms of either government mouthpiece or
government adversary. He suggested that the news media should, instead, be seen as an essential
service to the public, which ensures the provision of information.
Characteristics of the news media system in the four countries under study. Past
research split the world‟s media system into four categories, including controlled systems,
fragmented systems, highly regulated systems and moderately regulated systems (Dissanayke,
1997). The controlled media system is characterized by a high degree of control by the
government. This type of system can be found in both communist countries and rightist
authoritarian societies. A fragmented media system is characterized by the lack of a central
controlling force. The type of media system found in most developing countries is highly
regulated, where an appearance of independence masks a high degree of governmental
regulation. A media system that promotes open discussion within obvious limits is defined as
moderately regulated. Although some commentators seem to see the last as a free system, this
contention is not supported by the facts or actual situations. Based on the framework and above
analysis, the news media in China, Vietnam, the Philippines and the United States can be
categorized as follows (see Table 1):
Since the Chinese news media are totally in the hands of the government and allowed to
publish only those items of news, opinions, and viewpoints approved by the government, it is
described as centralized. The Vietnamese news media are identified as highly regulated, as some
of the news establishments are in private hands, but during times of national crisis, a rigid press
censorship is imposed and the newspapers disseminate basically what the government wants.
The Philippines‟s news media is fragmented and they do not necessarily see their role as one of
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supporting the government‟s actions. Also, a measure of chaos goes hand in hand with this
system during this conflict. The American press, on the other hand, sought to widen the field of
discourse regarding the conflict by seeking to examine the situation as deeply as the information
would permit. However, it does not play the role of an observer, but as the fourth party who also
has an impact on the other governments, the three countries‟ people and their news media.

Figure 6.Categories of the News Media under Study
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Journalist's Loyalty: to Nation or Profession?
News reporters insist that, ideally at least, they recount events without the intrusion of
value judgments or symbols. They repeatedly claim news reports are merely an honest
representation, a report on the facts, nothing but reality. Yet, news, akin to any literary or cultural
form, must rely on social norms and conventions (Starkey, 2007) because, in many cases,
journalists not only have influence on the culture in which they operate, but are also members of
a professional interpretative community. Foreman (2010) pointed out that journalism has a sociocultural function in constructing and shaping the community. As such, the journalists do not
explore reality from an external point of view, but rather function as representatives of the
society in which they operate and as delegates of the culture they share (Carey, 2000; Zandberg
& Neiger, 2005). In other words, they are involved in a community whose members share
common values and perceptions. Based on this viewpoint, journalistic work is embedded in a
broader social, cultural and political context. Yet, the problem is that the dual membership in
cultural and professional communities calls upon the journalists‟ contrasting loyalties. Past
research indicated that such tension is exacerbated at times of international conflict, when the
journalists may have to give precedence to either their national identity or professional identity
(Loyn, 2007; McGoldrick, 2006; Zandberg & Neiger, 2005).
Nationalism. Before analyzing the relation between news objectivity and nationalism, it
is important to clarify the meaning and significance of nationalism.
Nationalism has many connotations and it is identified with "a group based on a sense of
common heritage including some or all of these factors: language, ethnic or racial origins,
religion, geographic location or political base" (Purvis, 1992, p. 408). Purvis (1992) found that
nationalism is often associated with the goals of self-determination and independence, and the
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belief that the nation or nation-state deserves political loyalty. Landon defined nationalism as
"the expression of a feeling of cultural, tribal or ethnic oneness" (1943, p. 139). He suggested
that every people, even persons of different outlooks, have nationalism or patriotism of some sort
and perhaps always have had.
As nationalism has a political connotation, some researchers have focused on a modern
political nationalism. Kohn (1968) sees nationalism as a doctrine or set of ideas which is defined
as a political creed centering the supreme loyalty of the overwhelming majority of the people
upon the nation-state, either existing or desired. For Anderson et al. (1967) nationalism is
political action or movement. It is the assertion of the will to constitute an autonomous political
community by a self-conscious group or ideological movement, for the acquisition and
maintenance of self-government and independence on behalf of a group. Finally, some define
nationalism as sentiment, consciousness, or state of mind, emphasizing individuals' awareness
and loyalty to the nation and its tradition (e.g., Akzin, 1966; Shafer, 1955; Snyder, 1982).
From this perspective, the homeland is indispensable for economic wellbeing and
physical security (Smith, 2010). In this sense, nationalism rising in China, Vietnam, and the
Philippines during the South China Sea Conflict exemplifies the ideal of conscious attachment to
the nation.
Also, research has identified nationalism as a double-edged sword. "At times, it can
represent the outburst of the oppressed. At others, it is the vehicle of the oppressor" (Braisted,
1954, p.356). This means nationalism can be born of resentment. Binder (1964) and Kedourie
(1971) both agreed that it is the abstract love of nationalism that has fed the greatest act of terror.
As such, nationalism remains the world's most powerful, general, and primordial basis of cultural
and political identity.
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As nation-building and international conflicts reflect state interests and goals, Townsend
(1992) found that the issues tend to be defined in terms of state nationalism. Although the
primary nationalist components in the conflict under study here involve state pronouncements
and popular demonstrations, and even some military actions, they mostly enter the popular
culture as news headlines for large-scale mobilization of popular support against perceived
foreign threats.
The relationship between nationalism and news objectivity. Since the concept of
nationalism implies commonality, shared values, and loyalty to shared ideals, it always has a
boundary that includes "us" and excludes "them" (Anderson, 1983). This boundary is found to
prevail in war/conflict reporting as nationalism permeates almost every aspect of the culture of
public communication during national conflicts or wartimes. Thus, Anderson (1983) concluded
that there is probably no other principle to define mass media output and media reception as
clearly as the feeling of loyalty towards one's country, which is generally referred to as
"patriotism". Trabber (1995) went even further by claiming that such ideology of patriotism
imprisons the news media. Put another way, among the many influences and constraints
affecting the news media culture, none is more penetrating and elusive than nationalism.
Regardless of how critically one views the relationship between the news media and the
nation, or the media and the state, a universal human need exists for belonging. A family, a
community, a people, and a nation are those constituted of the essential social nature of the
human being. Trabber (1995) noticed that one of the main dogmas of modernity is not just
belonging to a nation, but being co-responsible for the nation's institutional political
arrangements and structures referred as "state". Yet, Horsman and Marshall (1994) argued that
such principal dogma of modern nationalism is fictional. "If soil and blood express the darker
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side of nationalism, so does the demand for absolute loyalty towards the state, or the claim that
any other social identity has to be submerged into the ultimately defining identity with the nation
state" (Horsman & Marshall, 1994, p. 45). These claims have become part of the notion of
patriotism and affect public communication as journalists consider it is their patriotic duty to
provide legitimization for the state's actions during international conflicts (Hill, 1991). Thus,
Trabber (1995) concluded that if this is what patriotism asks from media workers, then
patriotism is a major ethical problem for journalists.
In the case of multi-national conflicts, Cuthbert (1985) found that the press in each of the
parties in conflict takes an editorial stand which accurately reflects the attitude of their respective
governments. In other words, the news media of each nation or region react from the perceived
interests of their own national system. The journalists of each news organization have to find
words to report the complexity of external reality. Although each region paints the pictures so
differently and there are undoubtedly individual exceptions, it seems unlikely that the journalists
were deliberately distorting or slanting news. Yet, no matter how committed they are to the truth,
the journalists' selection of facts and their choice and organization of words grow out of their
different perspectives and ideological differences. The patriotic line of journalism also prevents
journalists from covering both sides of the stories as attempts to give the enemy's viewpoint may
be met with the charge of reproducing the enemy‟s propaganda (Trabber, 1995). Moreover, when
journalists actively endorse the patriotic line, they sometimes do so in defiance of public feeling.
For instance, in some cases the press claims that its patriotism reflects that of the public, fails to
acknowledge evidence of a more confused and diverse range of public opinion (Hill, 1991).
Stereotyping the "enemy" is another feature connected with the patriotic imperative in
international conflict reporting as the less one knows about other cultures, races and faiths, the
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easier it is to project the image one wishes or finds chance to use. However, Trabber (1995)
argued that the most amazing aspect about nationalism and news objectivity is not the
deceptions, lies and stereotypes of the "other" which are associated with them. He found the true
surprise is the fact that most people are unaware of how nationalism can result in the
manipulation of the news media under the name of patriotism. Therefore, Schiller (1981) pointed
out that the media's acclaimed objectivity in multinational conflicts is just a purposeful "myth".
News Framing: War Journalism Frame
War journalism is the term coined by Galtung (1986, 1998), referring to traditional
war/conflict coverage and framing that have a value bias toward violence and violent groups,
stemming from a victory-defeat paradigm. He suggested that war journalism is when editors and
reporters makes choices of what stories to report, and how to report them, which usually leads
audiences to overvalue violent responses to conflict and ignore non-violent alternatives. War
journalism was said to have four main characteristics: oriented in war/violence, propaganda,
elites and victory. War journalism is oriented in war/violence as it focuses on the conflict arena,
the two parties and the ultimate goal of winning. In other words, it generally has a zero-sum
orientation. It tends to find out who threw the first stone to assign the blame rather than to find a
solution. Also, this type of news framing is very propaganda- and elite- oriented because its
emphasis is on elite and official sources. Lastly, war journalism often conceals peace-initiatives
before victory is at hand. Moreover, Galtung and Vincent (1992) found that war journalism and
conflict reporting are characterized by military triumphalist language, an action-oriented focus
and a superficial narrative with little context, background or historical perspectives. In other
words, the latent meaning of any frame is often translated instantaneously by specific types of
framing devices such as catchphrases, metaphors, graphics and allusions to nationalism and war
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journalism. Such concrete points of framing war journalism are later summarized and outlined by
Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) (see Figure 7).

Figure 7. War-journalism frame. Adapted from Peace Journalism, by J.Lynch and A.
McGoldrick, 2005, Gloucestershire: Hawthorn Press.
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Research has long found that framing theory offers a useful way of understanding the
news-making process. While agenda-setting deals with factors that may influence the news
media's selection of issues to report, framing discusses how the news media select specific
frames in presenting the issues (Scheufele, 1999). Watson (2007) utilized the newspaper page as
a frame into which journalists can put headlines, captions, the positioning of photographs, the
differing styles, and sizes of print such as the longer the story, the smaller the type-size. Gamson
and Lasch (1993) suggested that a frame organizes central ideas for understanding events related
to the issue in questions. Going into further details, Entman (2007) defined news framing as the
process of picking out a few elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that
highlights connections among them to promote a particular interpretation. He pointed out that
fully developed frames generally perform four functions, including problem definition, causal
analysis, moral judgment, and remedy promotion. As such, news framing works to introduce or
raise the salience and apparent importance of certain topics, activating schemas that can
encourage target audiences to think, feel and act in a particular way. Entman (2007) also brought
to notice that the character of a frame could be identified by various devices, including
metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases, depictions, moral appeals, visual images and other symbolic
devices.
Lewis and Reese (2009) maintained that frames play a central role in political
communication as they help define the terms of debate, share public opinion through the
persuasive use of symbols, and, when most effective, lead to public policy change. They serve as
the main vehicle "through which public officials, the news media and other elites exercise
political influence over one another and the public at large" (Lewis & Reese, 2009, p. 85).
Apparently, frames don't arise organically. They are constructed and disseminated according to
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social and institutional interests. As such, framing can be seen as an exercise in power. Yet, such
power does not come from out of nowhere. It largely depends on the news media's acceptance
and advancement of those frames.
When it comes to covering conflicts, defined as a relationship between two or more
parties having incompatible goals, needs and interests (Mitchell, 1981), past studies point out
that how news media frame issues becomes essential to how people understand the conflict.
Gamson (1992) listed four frames used in framing the Arab-Israeli conflict: strategic interests,
feuding neighbors, Arab's die-hardism, and Israeli expansionism. In the Middle East conflict,
Wolfsfeld (1997) identified the "drama frame" in which the news media focused on the
extremists from both sides rather than on voices calling for peace.
More recently, Carruthers (2000) found that the news media, subjected to state and
military censorship, employed the same values and priorities in reporting conflict as in covering
other events. Therefore, he suggested that the news media become willing abettors in wartime
propaganda and even play a role in provoking conflict. War propaganda is defined as a facet of
military power calculated to gain public backing for war, or violent responses to conflict (Lynch,
2007). Lynch argue that "war propaganda works because it fits or articulates with the established
conventions of war journalism" (2008, p.136).
Later, Ting Lee and Maslog (2005) developed Galtung (1986, 1998)‟s typology of war
journalism into 13 indicators of war journalism. These indicators are extracted from the text of
stories whose narratives are framed by either war or peace journalism and comprise of two
themes: approach and language. The approach-based criteria includes: (1) reactivity, (2)
visibility of effects of war, (3) elite orientation, (4) differences, (5) focus on here and now, (6)
good and bad dichotomy, (7) two-party orientation, (8) partisanship, (9) winning orientation, and
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(10) continuity of reports. The language-based criteria focus on language and consist of: (1)
victimizing, (2) demonizing and (3) emotive. (See Appendix A for examples of each of the 13
characteristics of war journalism).
A story is considered to be “reactive” if the reporter waits for war or violence to break
out before reporting it. It is mainly focus on the “visible effects of war” such as casualties, death
toll, or damage to property when ignoring psychological impacts. A news article has “elite
orientation” if its content is mostly sourced from government officials, and/or political leaders.
“Differences” means the story is to exploit major differences that lead to dispute(s) among
conflicting parties rather than reporting similarities, progress on common issue(s) or previous
agreement(s). A story focuses on “here and now” when it is very poor in context and tends to
focus on violence as its own causes, failing to report the conflict‟s possibility of structural and
psychological causes and outcomes. “Good and bad dichotomy” refers to the approach of
drawing a polarity of “us” and “them” to dichotomize between the good guys and bad guys, the
victims and the villains. “Two-party orientation” is defined as the tendency of war journalism to
reduce the number of parties to two, and to draw a clear distinction between winners and losers.
“Partisanship” indicates that a story framed by war-journalism has its value bias towards one side
in the conflict, ignoring or concealing initiatives from the other side or third parties, particularly
any option for a non-violent outcome which does not give victory to “our side”. The “winning
orientation” reflects the evident sport archetype of war-journalism framing, where winning is the
only thing and this orientation assumes that one side‟s needs can only be met by the other side‟s
compromise or defeat. “Continuity of reports” addresses to journalists‟ practices of quashing
coverage of the conflict with peace treaty signing and ceasefire, then heading for another war
elsewhere. The three language-based criteria of “victimizing language”, “demonizing language”,
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“emotive words” are to give evidence of war journalism‟s common focus on the human drama
and tragedy of violence. “Victimizing language” is employed to tell what has been done to
people and paint them as victims of doomsday scenarios who are irreparably damaged by the
conflict and appear to have no future. “Demonizing language” is used to demonize the enemy,
while humanizing the participants on our side. Lastly, “emotive words” are to create emotional
effects of war journalism by taking advantages of audiences‟ feelings resulted from the conflict
such as hopeless and powerless, anxiety, mood disturbance, sadness and a sense of insecurity
with physical and social environment.
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CHAPTER V
DATA ANALYSIS
Research Methodology
The study involves a qualitative comparative analysis, a research technique developed by
Ragin (1987) for solving problems caused by making causal inferences on the basis of only a
small number of cases. Grounded on the binary logic of Boolean algebra, the technique is to
maximize the number of comparisons that can be made across the cases under investigation, in
terms of the presence or absence of the characteristics (variables) of analytical interest (Marshall,
1988). For example, 18 cases (e.g., nation-states) that involve seven independent variables
(presence or absence of economic recession, of an external threat to state security, etc.,) might be
examined in order to identify the causal factors involved in the emergence of revolutions
(Marshall, 1988). Ragin suggested that qualitative comparative analysis had clear advantage over
content analysis, which only aims at quantitatively analyzing the meaning and characteristics of
any context (Krippendorf, 1980), as the former combines the strengths of both case-oriented
(qualitative) and variable-orientated approaches.
The study examines 164 stories from one English-language daily newspaper from each of
the three countries involved directly in the SCS conflict, including China's Global Times,
Vietnam's Thanh Nien News, and the Philippines Daily Inquirer. Coverage of the New York
Times is also analyzed for the sake of comparison and understanding the perspective of leading
international observers.
The data was collected from issues published of the four newspapers during the twomonth period of the conflict, lasting from May 28, 2011 to July 30, 2011. This represents the
most recent peak period of the conflict that involved military presence. It was a particularly tense
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episode between Vietnam and China, fueling a war of words that sent the two communist
neighbors to the brink of using armed forces.
The search terms “South China Sea Conflict” or “South China Sea Dispute” and/or
“Vietnam”, “China”, “the Philippines” and “the U.S.” were combined to search for relevant
articles on the Lexis Nexis Database, Google, or a search tool integrated in the newspapers‟
website. The unit of analysis was the individual story or article, a definition including hard news
stories, feature stories, opinion pieces (Op-Ed), and others such as letters to the editors.
About a third of the stories were obtained from the Lexis Nexis online database. For
papers not archived on databases, such as Thanh Nien News or Global Times, stories were
obtained from the newspapers' online archives. Although searches were initiated by keywords,
all downloaded stories were assessed for direct relevance. For instance, stories reporting on
tourism but with the South China Sea mentioned in passing are rejected. Only stories focusing on
the dispute over the sea such as violence, debates, diplomatic activities, political speeches, and
related developments are included in the analysis. There are 60 articles from the Global Times,
50 articles from the Philippine Daily Inquirer, 36 news stories from the Thanh Nien News, and
18 articles from the New York Times.
To explore how the coverage of the SCS conflict may differ among the media outlets in
the conflicting countries and the dominant framing techniques they used, the present study adapts
nine of Ting Lee and Maslog's (2005) criteria in conflict reporting and adds an extra languagebased criterion of military vocabulary. The study utilizes only nine out of 13 war-journalism
indicators in conflict reporting developed by Ting Lee and Maslog's (2005) because while acts of
provocation and high prospects of military confrontation over the SCS conflict do exist, none of
the six claimants has officially declared war against one another.
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Under this study, a news article has “elite orientation” if its content is sourced from
government officials, and/or political leaders, identified by looking at who is being quoted or
mentioned as sources in the story. Political elite is defined as government official representing
the formal viewpoints of his/her respective government. Meanwhile, official sources might
include academic researchers, organizations, etc., who are not necessary support their
government‟s stance on the SCS conflict. “Conflict outcomes focused on war options” is to
examine if a story leads its audiences to overvalue violent responses to this conflict and ignore
peaceful alternatives. Similar to Ting Lee and Maslog's (2005)‟s indicator of “differences”,
“focus mainly on differences that led to the conflict” is an indicator to explore whether a story
delving into major differences that lead to disputes among the conflicting parties or promoting
similarities, common interests or peaceful negotiations. “Frequent good/bad tagging” is to
identify the good guys and bad guys, the victim and the bully in the SCS conflict. This indicator
is accessed by condemning languages and attitudes (e.g., aggressor, big bully, aggressive actions,
encroachments, etc.). Partisanship is the indicator obtained by examining if a story has its value
bias towards only one country in the SCS conflict, ignoring or concealing initiatives from the
other side or third parties, particularly any option for a non-violent outcome which does not give
victory to its side. Zero-sum victory-defeat orientation is obtained by studying the abovementioned winning orientation reflected in a story. Victimizing language, military vocabulary,
demonizing language, emotive words are the four language-based criteria of are to access
evidence of war journalism in discourse of the SCS conflict. The indicator of military vocabulary
is added to enable this study to identify level of potential triggers of armed enforcement in this
international dispute.
1. Emphasis on political elite and official sources.
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2. Conflict outcomes focused on war options.
3. Focus mainly on differences that led to the conflict.
4. Frequent good/bad tagging.
5. Partisanship: biased for one side in the conflict.
6. Zero-sum victory-defeat orientation.
7. Victimizing language.
8. Military vocabulary.
9. Uses demonizing language.
10. Uses emotive words.
These ten criteria are used to code, tabulate, and evaluate the data. Indexes are produced
to classify whether a story is oriented toward war journalism, with a score of 1 given to each of
these 10 criteria. A score of 1 is recorded when a war-journalism indicator is found in a story.
Each single story can have a minimum score of 0 (no war-journalism indicator is found) and a
maximum score of 10 (10 war-journalism indicators are all found).
Measures of central tendency of the 10 war journalism indicators were used to identify
which newspaper is more tilted towards war journalism compared to other newspapers. The four
newspapers were compared based on average of scores of war-journalism indicators found in a
newspaper (mean), the middle value of scores of war-journalism indicators found in a newspaper
(median), the value of scores of war journalism indicators that appears the most in a newspaper
(mode), and the total summary scores of war journalism indicators found in a newspaper (sum).
Apart from examining which media outlet is more oriented toward a war journalism
frame, and which war-journalism indicator is more prominent, other variables studied included
the story type (news, feature, and opinion pieces), and sources (local, foreign/national news
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agencies, wire service) (see Appendix B). Hard news is mostly fast-paced and front-page news,
generally up to the minute and takes a factual approach. If news reporting should be informative,
fact-based and has a timeliness connected to it, a feature story also presents factual information
but without timeliness. Therefore, this news type employs a more leisurely pace than deadline
hard-news.

However, both are relatively objective because no opinion or conclusions are

included. An opinion piece, on the other hand, functions to express the opinions of the writer or
the newspaper. In other words, the newspaper tells its reader what happened and then give its
opinion on this matter. While focusing on the same topic, feature news covers the SCS conflict in
much greater depth and detail compared to hard news and with much less editorial content
compared to opinion pieces.
In the context of coverage of the SCS conflict, nationalistic element is defined as any
thought, view, or attitude to support a conflicting party by strongly opposing against other
parties, based mainly on emotion instead of reason. A story is coded as having nationalistic
elements if linguistic elements purport to express such highly emotional thoughts, views or
attitudes. The below quote from the Philippines Inquirer is an example:
"Although we support a diplomatic solution, let there be no doubt in anybody‟s mind, in any
foreign powers mind, that if they dare to eject us from Pagasa, Filipinos will not take that sitting
down. Filipinos are willing to die for their soil," (Flag waving in the Spratlys, July 22).
Due to limited condition of a master thesis, the author of this thesis is the sole coder.
Global Times. The Global Times belongs to the People's Daily and is China's secondlargest English-daily distributed nationally, in terms of circulation number, after the China Daily.
The English edition of the Global Times started publishing in April 2009 as an effort by China's
state media to have a greater influence abroad and counteract what Chinese officials see as

44

biased reporting from the foreign press. “A 24-page newspaper with nationwide distribution, the
English edition will be a vital new medium affording international readers the opportunity to
discover and understand China, while allowing Chinese to express themselves to the world,”
reads the paper's website. According to China' Sobao Advertising Agency, Global Times is by
circulation the third-largest newspaper in China, with a daily print readership of 2.4 million, and
reported web readership of 10 million.
The Global Times is chosen because it has a different mission from its parent publishing
organization of the People‟s Daily, which is often seen as China's state mouthpiece. Although
the Global Times is also a state-owned paper subject to the same censorship regime, it has
evolved a more populist function since its founding 19 years ago. The paper is believed to attract
and actually engage readers, rather than to simply telegraph intentions of the China's Foreign
Ministry or the Organization Department (Larson, 2011).
Thanh Nien News. Thanh Nien is a publication of the Vietnam National Youth
Federation, and has been one of the most influential newspapers in Vietnam for 26 years. Its
Vietnamese daily publication has a total readership of more than 2 million per week, making it
one of the most widely circulated newspapers in the country. Thanh Nien News is the English
language versions of Thanh Nien, which was first launched online in 2004 and became a 16-page
daily print in 2007.
Although the move toward a market economy has made rigid censorship more difficult in
Vietnam, the country is still a communist state. As such, most state outlets often avoid
"sensitive" and controversial topics to reinforce a party-friendly line. Thanh Nien News is
selected because its journalism is seen as relatively bold compared to other state-owned papers.
Although the paper also follows the party line on certain topics, it often presents alternative
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viewpoints; even on sensitive topics and even if they are directly and outspokenly critical of the
government. Thanh Nien News publishes all its top Vietnamese language stories in English.
The Philippine Daily Inquirer. The Philippine Daily Inquirer, also known as the
Inquirer, is the most widely circulated newspaper in the Philippines, with a daily circulation of
260,000 copies. It was founded 26 years ago as one of the first private newspapers in the country.
Despite its private ownership, the newspaper is one of the country's newspapers of record since
its editorial and news-gathering functions are considered professional and typically authoritative.
The Philippine media landscape is completely different from that of China and Vietnam.
The country's media have been touted as the freest, most boisterous in Southeast Asia. Most of
the local and national newspapers are published in English as the majority of Filipinos can speak
and understand English very well. Yet, the Philippines ranks third on the Committee to Protect
Journalists' Global Impunity Index, a quantitative measure of the number of journalists killed
world-wide for their work. Its news media is also seen as vulnerable to pressures on their
proprietors and protective of the interests of their owners. Therefore, the Philippine Daily
Inquirer is selected for its openness in expressing views on just about anything, including
politics.
The New York Times. The New York Times is the third largest circulated newspapers in
the United States, according to a report compiled by the Audit Bureau of Circulation for the sixmonth period ending March 31, 2011. Being one of the flagships of the American news media, it
helps set the national media agenda. The New York Times is selected for this study because, apart
from news, it has in-depth analysis and reporting, which is of particular relevant for this study's
purposes. Moreover, as a daily newspaper, the New York Times offers the most up-to-date news,
allowing readers to track the latest developments in the SCS conflict in the fastest way. The
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newspaper is also one of few mainstream media organizations in the United States that has been
reporting on the SCS conflict consistently for decades. Further, the New York Time is widely
distributed around the world and has a tradition of excellence in foreign coverage (Zein &
Cooper, 1992).
Findings and Discussions
RQ1: Which country's media gives more coverage to the conflict? Vietnam,
Philippines, China, or international news organizations? Of the total 164 stories, the Global
Times dominates with 37 percent (60 stories), followed by the Philippine Daily Inquirer with 30
percent (50 stories). Vietnam's Thanh Nien News had 22 percent (36 stories) to the coverage of
the conflict during this 2-month period, whereas the New York Times constituted 11 percent of
the total coverage (18 stories).

Figure 8. Frequency of Coverage among the Four Newspapers
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RQ2: Which types of articles (or coverage) are used more frequently? Hard news
reports, features, editorials, or others (e.g., letters to the editors, picture gallery)? Of the
total of 164 stories, 73 (43.7%) were hard news stories, 52 (31.1%) were news features, 36
(21.6%) were opinion pieces including editorials, and 6 (3.6%) were listed as others (those
include letters to the editor, photo gallery, voices, talk around town and daily quotes). Only a
very small number of stories (9 stories or 5.4%) were produced by international wire services,
including the Associated Press, Agence France Press, and Reuters. The majority (158 stories or
94.6%) were produced by local sources. Of the 158 stories produced locally, only 14 stories
(8.9%) were sourced from national news agencies. The Global Times is the newspaper having the
highest number of stories sourced from a country‟s own national news services. It has 16.7
percent of stories sourced from Xinhua, the China's national news agency. Foreign wire services,
on the other hand, are the major source for Thanh Nien News. Freelancers, academics, and
members of the public contributed to 9.5% (15 stories) among locally produced articles, while
81.6% (129 stories) were written by the newspapers' own reporters.

Figure 9. News Categories: All Four Newspapers
The Global Times. On average, 43 percent of the Global Times' coverage is hard news,
while opinion pieces account for 27 percent (16 stories). Feature stories make up 23 percent of
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Global Times stories while other news types such as photo gallery or daily quotes share just
about 7 percent of the total.
News Categories: The Global Times

Opinion Pieces
27%

Others
7%
Hard News
43%

Feature Stories
23%

Figure 10. News Categories: The Global Times.
The Philippines Inquirer.

Similar to the Global Times, hard news prevails in coverage

by the Philippine Inquirer with 42 percent (21 stories). However, there is a significantly greater
percentage of feature stories in the Philippine newspaper compared to the Chinese paper. Feature
stories comprise 38 percent, whereas opinion pieces only constitute 18 percent of the total. Other
types of news only contributed 2 percent to the whole coverage.

Figure 11. News Categories: The Philippines Inquirer
Thanh Nien News. Coverage in the Thanh Nien News has a slightly different structure from both
the Philippine and the Chinese newspapers as its coverage only consists of hard news, features
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and opinion pieces. Hard news is still the most dominant kind of news with 47 percent, followed
by feature stories with 36 percent. Thanh Nien News's opinion pieces accounts for 17 percent.

Figure 12. News Categories: Thanh Nien News
The New York Times. Again, the prime story type of the New York Times' coverage is
hard news with 44 percent. Feature stories make up a considerable amount with 33 percent of the
total coverage, whereas opinion pieces only count for 17 percent.

Figure 13. News Categories: The New York Times
Since the development in the SCS conflict during the period under study marks a new
round of tensions since the 1980s, it is not surprising that hard news comprises the majority of
news coverage on the issue. These stories are mostly front-page news, up to the minute and take
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a factual approach: What happened? Who/which country was involved? Where and when did it
happen? Why? There is a significance difference between the Global Times and Thanh Nien
News, the Philippines Inquirer, and the New York Times in the amount of space dedicated to
opinion pieces. Opinion pieces make up the second largest part of the coverage in the Global
Times, whereas feature stories comprise the second-largest quantity of the other three
newspapers' coverage. On a newsworthy issue like the SCS conflict, opinion pieces were
informed by facts, but then a particular point of view was found shining through in order to try to
persuade readers to agree with the opinion. This means an opinion piece is more to persuade
rather than to inform. However, this important point could be lost on readers of these
newspapers, especially the Global Times, as news and editorials are found mixed together in the
paper. In the following example, it is difficult for readers to be clear that the Global Times was
opining and reporting news because it is factual but highly opinionated and one-sided to make a
point.
“Hundreds of Vietnamese gathered outside the Chinese embassy in Hanoi on Sunday to demand
that China stay out of waters claimed by Vietnam, which a Chinese scholar said risked
undermining bilateral relations [...] The rare demonstration must have been approved tacitly by
the Vietnamese government and is aimed at pressuring China on the South China Sea [...]"
(Vietnam protest damages ties, The Global Times, June 7).
RQ3: Do the mainstream media outlets serve as mouthpieces of the political elite?
"News is not necessarily what happens, but what a news source says has happened," (Sigal,
1973, p.121).
A frequency count shows that political elites are the most likely source for the news
coverage on the SCS during the studied period, with 88.4 percent of the four newspapers' stories
either coming from or focused on elites or official sources. Among the four newspapers, the
Philippine Inquirer is the one that depends most heavily on governmental officials or political
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elites as its news sources (94%), followed by the New York Times (88.9%) and Thanh Nien
News (86%), respectively. The Global Times is found to rely the least on elite sources (85%).
The findings reveal that elites and official sources frame the news discourse of the SCS
conflict, which is an issue of critical importance for foreign policy and regional and national
security. Taking into account their national security and interest, media professionals from all the
four countries in this study are shown to stick to the safe side by supporting and reflecting their
government's foreign policy decisions. This suggests that the main role of the news media in this
conflict is basically to legitimate the actions of their government. In other words, the Global
Times serves a domestic political function in an authoritarian system which relies on nationalism
for its legitimacy while having a formal policy to promote a harmonious world.

Figure 14. Dependence on Elite Sources.
RQ4: Has the media discourse of the SCS conflict been predominantly guided
towards war journalism? Scores are given to each of the ten war-journalism indicators, ranging
from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest). This mean each story could have from none up to 10 indicators.
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The ten war journalism indicators are found in every single studied story. Out of the total 164
stories, 6.7 percent of them have found having eight war journalism indicators; 8.5 percent are
found having seven war journalism indicators; 17 percent of stories have six war journalism
indicators; 20 percent of stories have five war journalism indicators; 22 percent have four war
journalism indicators; 7.3 percent have three war journalism indicators; 10.4 percent have two
war journalism indicators, and 8 percent have only one war journalism indicator (see Table 1).
Overall, in the sample, the war-journalism frame prevails the media discourse of the SCS
conflict.
In greater details, 88.4 percent of the total stories put emphasis on elite and official
sources (Indicator 1), followed by partisanship (Indicator 5) found in 87.2% of stories; 77.9
percent of stories focused on the differences leading to the conflict (Indicator 3), while 65.2
percent have the good/bad tagging indicator (Indicator 4). Demonizing language (Indicator 9) is
found in 43.9 percent of total stories, whereas 38.4 percent promote war options as the conflict
outcome (Indicator 2). Military language (Indicator 8) is used in 37.1 percent of stories, and 30.5
percent have the zero-sum victory-defeat orientation (Indicator 6). Finally, emotive language is
an element of only 15.9 percent of stories.
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Table 1
Frequency Distribution of War Journalism Indicators in a Single Story (Total Data)

No of War Journalism Indicators

Frequency

%

8

11

6.7

7

14

8.5

6

28

17

5

33

20

4

36

22

3

12

7.3

2

17

10.4

1

13

8
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Figure 15. War Journalism Indicators Found in the Four Newspapers.
The Global Times.

Based on a frequency count of 60, the four most salient indicators

of war journalism found in the Global Times‟ coverage are partisanship (98.3 %), focus on
differences leading to the conflict (86.7%), emphasis on elite and official sources (85%), and
frequent bad/good tagging (73.3%). In this section quotes illustrating these indicators are
provided.
Being partisan, the Global Times stories were biased for one side of the conflict (China).
The following quote illustrates this indicator.
"Vietnam's unilateral resources exploration in the South China Sea broke the China-ASEAN
consensus. Beijing's corresponding moves were not in violation of any international
agreements," (Beijing rebuffs Hanoi offshore oil, gas claims, May 30).
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It The Global Times also confined the conflict to the differences among the conflicting
parties, with biased judgment about the United States, Vietnam and the Philippines, and assigned
blame to other countries for starting and/or worsening the conflict. The following quotes
illustrate the indicator of focusing on differences leading to the conflict.
"The South China Sea is not the only place triggering conflicts over sovereignty. But not all
countries are scrambling for their interests and preparing for action, as some countries off the
South China Sea are doing today," (Clear red line needed in South China Sea, June 19).
Similar to the main trend, stories of the Chinese newspaper tended to focus on political
elites; that is, Chinese political leaders and military officials such as Chinese foreign minister
Yang Jiechi, or China's minister of defence Liang Guanglie. Quoting government and military
officials on a frequent basis served this function-to report the conflict from the point of view of
the Chinese political elites. The following quote illustrates this indicator.
"'China's stance on the South China Sea is clear and consistent. We oppose the oil and
gas operations conducted by Vietnam, which have undermined China's interests and
jurisdictional rights in the South China Sea and violated the consensus both countries have
reached on the issue,' China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Jiang Yu said late
Saturday," (Beijing rebuffs Hanoi offshore oil, gas claims, May 30)
The Global Times used frequent good/bad tagging to give name to their evil-doers (i.e.,
Vietnam, the Philippines and the United States). Condemning language and attitude were
adopted in any reference to the respective conflicting parties. This indicator was found following
in the following examples.
"The Philippines is obviously piling on the pressure for China by talking about
internationalizing the issues, but the involvement of any other parties will not help address the
differences," (Experts dismiss Filipino maritime concerns, June 2).
"But unlike the US' ultimate goal of hampering China and driving it further away from the
Pacific, China's military strength is aimed at restoring the validity of the Yalta System to what it
ought to be and with this China's rightful claim of Taiwan. Such claims are rational and
reasonable and have a bright future ahead," (Oceanic strategy not aimed at US interests, June
9).
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"The drill is undoubtedly intended as a military show of force toward China. [...] Through the
flexing of its muscle, Vietnam wants to demonstrate its resolution to maintain its claims on the
Nansha Islands," (Vietnam set for major naval drill, June 13)
"The patience that Vietnam and the Philippines used to possess has been replaced by an impulse
to act tough. This might be part of what US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described as
“smart power,” with which the US appears to be reaching out to countries around the South
China Sea, while in fact; it is masterminding discontent and resentment among them. The US
looks to be the biggest winner from this discord," (US intervention in South China Sea daft, June
14).

Figure 16. War Journalism Indicators: The Global Times.
The New York Times. The four most salient war journalism indicators in the coverage of
the New York Times, based on a frequency count of 18, are emphasis on elite and official sources
(88.9%), focus mainly on differences leading to the conflict (83.4%), conflict outcomes focused
on war options (66.7%), and zero-sum victory defeat orientation (61%). Being an international
observer, the New York Times pursued a multiparty orientation, giving voice to the many
countries involved. Yet, political elites and official sources still comprised the largest proportion
of its coverage of the conflict. Also, the New York Times mostly emphasized causes of the
conflict and tended to report violence and war options.
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Figure 17. War Journalism Indicators: The New York Times.
The Philippine Inquirer.

The Philippine Inquirer 's coverage of the SCS conflict

was mostly supported by the following four war journalism indicators, based on a frequency of
50: emphasis on elite and official sources (94%), partisanship (84%), focus on differences
leading to the conflict (70%), and use of demonizing language (54%). The dominant voice of the
Philippine coverage was still from official and political elite sources. It also employed a partisan
approach in reporting the conflict as a patriotic and vocal supporter of the Philippine stance.
Consequently, it is not surprising to find its coverage dig deep into the involved parties'
disagreements, particularly between the Philippines and China. In using demonizing language,
the newspaper often portrayed the Chinese activities as wicked, agressive and threatening.
The following quote illustrates the emphasis on elite and official sources indicator:
“Defense secretary Voltaire Gazmin is apparently wearying of the double talk coming from his
Chinese counterpart amid reports of fresh incursions into the Philippine-claimed portions of the
Spratly Islands in the West Philippine Sea (or South China Sea),” (DND chief accuses China of
double talk, July 23).
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The following quote illustrates the indicator of partisanship:
"At the same time, the Filipino people condemn the arrogance of Chinas sole claim over the
disputed islands, its refusal to recognize the claims of other nations, and its refusal to engage in
multilateral negotiations, it added," (Pinoy reds rap China, US, PH over Spartlys, July 6).
The following quote illustrates the focus on differences leading to the conflict indicator:
"China speaks with both ends of its mouth on the Spratlys. Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai
urges restraint on the part of the United States which has declared its support for allies in the
dispute. The US, the minister says, should limit itself to urging more restraint and responsible
behavior from those countries that have been frequently taking provocative actions. But how else
do we characterize Chinas actuations, including sending navy ships to the disputed waters and
arresting Vietnamese and Filipino fishermen who venture too close to the claimed islands? Are
these not also provocative? Is this just diplomat before guns and aircraft carriers are brought in
to do the talking?" (Common use in the Spartlys, June 28).
The following quote illustrates the indicator of demonizing language:
"China will become the threat it will not only become the giant but it will become the monster,"
(China will become ruthless monster, says Indon expert, July 15).

Figure 18. War Journalism Indicators: The Philippines Inquirer.
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Thanh Nien News. Based on a frequency count of 36, the four most prominent war
journalism indicators found in coverage of the Thanh Nien News are: partisanship (91.6%),
emphasis on elite and official sources (86.12%), main focus on differences leading to the conflict
(80.6%), and frequent good/bad tagging (72.3%%). As a conflicting party, it is observed that the
Vietnamese newspaper's coverage of the conflict also privileged prevailing views of the
country's political elites, being strongly supportive for the Vietnamese claims. Also, the majority
of its stories denounced Chinese actions in the SCS.
Based on a frequency count of 36, the four most prominent war journalism indicators
found in coverage of the Thanh Nien News are: partisanship (91.6%), emphasis on political elites
and official sources (86.12%), main focus on differences leading to the conflict (80.6%), and
frequent good/bad tagging (72.3%). As a conflicting party, it is observed that the Vietnamese
newspaper's coverage of the conflict also privilidged prevailing views of the country's political
elites, being strongly supportive for the Vietnamese claims. Also, the majority of its stories
denounced Chinese actions in the SCS.
In the following quote the focus on differences leading to the conflict indicator is
illustrated:
"China‟s harassment towards Vietnam and its violations of international regulations and normal
practices can cause discontent to any people of any country. China is acting aggressively but at
the same time accusing another country of being tough," (Chinese press distorting information,
threatening Vietnamese people, June 23).
The following quote illustrates the indicator of frequent good/bad tagging:

"Over the years, China has maintained a peaceful and stable environment to develop its
economy and has always tried to build up a good image. However, while waiting for a good
opportunity, it continued to implement in secret its strategies related to the East Sea. And now it
seems to believe that it is strong enough to play the role of a big country," (China has always
wanted the whole of East Sea, June 11)
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"The behaviors of the Chinese vessels are inconsistent with international law and regional
norms,” (Maritime experts cry foul on China, June 3).

Figure 19. War Journalism Indicators: Thanh Nien News
RQ5: Which newspaper is identified more tilted towards war journalism? In terms
of country, the four newspapers differ in their war framing of stories. The strongest war
journalism framing is found in the SCS conflict by the Chinese and the American newspapers,
followed by the Philipine newspaper and the Vietnamese newspaper, respectively. The following
discusses the patterns of framing for each of these newspapers.
The Global Times and the New York Times. Although the war journalism frame is
strongest in the coverage of SCS conflict by both the Global Times and the New York Times,
there is a significant higher proportion of war journalism frames observed in the Chinese paper
than in the American paper. The Global Times's summary score for the ten war journalism
indicators is 295 (per 60 stories), while that number for the New York Times is 97 (per 18
stories). The highest number of war journalism indicators found in a single story of both
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newspapers is 8. Yet, 25% of the Global Times' stories have 6 war indicators, whereas stories
with 4 war indicators mostly dominate coverage of the New York Times. (see Table 2, 3).
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Table 2
Global Times Data Summary Statistics

Mean

4.92

Median

5

Mode

6

Standard Deviation

2.02

Minimum

1

Maximum

8

Sum

295
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Table 3
The New York Times Data Summary Statistics

Mean

5.38

Median

5

Mode

4

Standard Deviation

1.71

Minimum

2

Maximum

8

Sum

97
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The Philippine Inquirer and Thanh Nien News.

The Philippine Inquirer's coverage

shows a more salient war journalism frame compared to the Thanh Nien News. The Philippine
newspaper's summary score of total war journalism is 189, which is slightly higher than that of
the Vietnamese newspaper (165). The highest number of war journalism indicators that can be
found in a single story of both the two newspapers is 7. The frequency of distribution for the
Philippine Inquirer is 5 and for the Thanh Nien News is 4. Similarly, at least one war journalism
indicator is found in every story of both newspapers. Also, they are both dominated by stories
with 5 war journalism indicators, with 25 percent for coverage of the Thanh Nien News and 22
percent for coverage of the Philippine Inquirer (see Table 4, 5).
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Table 4
The Philippine Inquirer Data Summary Statistics

Mean

3.78

Median

4

Mode

5

Standard Deviation

1.78

Minimum

1

Maximum

7

Sum

189
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Table 5
Thanh Nien News Data Summary Statistics

Mean

4.58

Median

5

Mode

5

Standard Deviation

1.6

Minimum

1

Maximum

7

Sum

165

67

RQ6: In the overall coverage, which country got more unfavorable coverage and
was framed as aggressors? Overall, 65.2 percent of the studied stories had some kind of
condemnation. China's actions in the SCS conflict was the most common object of the
condemnations (59%), while the most vocal critics were from the Philippine Inquirer (43%),
followed by the Thanh Nien News (41%) and the New York Times (16%).
As China's claim over virtually the whole SCS contends with all other claimants, the
standard editorial stance of Thanh Nien News, the Philippines Inquirer and the New York Times
is to depict China as the bully with words such as "threaten", "rob", "illegal invasion",
"warmonger", or even "monster"...etc. The following quote from the Philippines Inquirer serves
as an example:
“Andi Widjajanto, a professor at the Department on International Relations Studies at the
Universitas Indonesia based in Depok, said China would become a ruthless monster by then
and trigger conflict in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) region,”( China will
become ruthless monster, says Indon expert, July 15)

The New York Times's coverage mostly discussed the possibility that China could seize
the dispute's new developments for a military expansion, becoming a dominant power in both the
Pacific region and the world. It commented that " the growing confidence of the Chinese Navy is
on open display," ( China navy reaches far, unsettling the region, June 15), and from an
American standpoint " the Chinese have been ambiguous about their motivations, " (Wary rivals,
U.S. and China try to reach truce on military strategy, July 15). Another such quote was:
"We still don't see eye-to-eye with China over military operating rights in the South China Sea.
We still don't fully understand China's justification for the rapid growth in its defense spending
or its long-term military modernization goals. And we don't believe that China should be allowed
to resolve disputes in contested waters by coercing smaller nations," (A step toward trust with
China, July 26).
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Coverage in both the Philippine Inquirer and Thanh Nien News, on the other hand,
highlighted condemnations of what they characterized as China's sovereignty violation, big
power behavior, misleading information, increasing aggression, and its refusal to engage in
multilateral negotiations.
The Philippine Inquirer voiced that the country's public outcry over "the increasingly
aggressive Chinese intrusions" and accused the Chinese of triggering a dramatic rise in tensions
between the two countries such as firing on Filipino fishermen, harassing Filipino ships or
creeping invasion (Strong Warning to China, July 27). The Inquirer also accused China of
double talk, espousing policies of peace and friendship on one hand while taking provocative and
pressurizing actions that totally belie such claims on the other.
"China speaks with both ends of its mouth on the Spratlys. Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai
urges restraint on the part of the United States which has declared its support for allies in the
dispute. The US, the minister says, should limit itself to urging more restraint and responsible
behavior from those countries that have been frequently taking provocative actions. But how else
do we characterize Chinas actuations, including sending navy ships to the disputed waters and
arresting Vietnamese and Filipino fishermen who venture too close to the claimed islands? Are
these not also provocative? Is this just diplomatese before guns and aircraft carriers are brought
in to do the talking?" (Common Use in the Spratlys, June 28).
“But even as China intensifies its show of force, Chinese officials continue to reassure its
neighbor that it wants nothing more than peace. In Singapore last Sunday, Chinese Defense
Minister Liang Guanglie said his country was committed to peace and stability in the South
China Sea. He said China would never threaten any country or seek hegemony.
Maybe China has a different definition of what constitutes peace, but firing shots over fishing
vessels and pushing away research ships are not peaceful acts anywhere. Which is why Filipino
officials have lately dropped all diplomatic pretenses and has directly accused China of serious
violations of Philippine sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction. Foreign Secretary Albert del
Rosario has said that while the Philippines is committed to follow international laws, the 2002
Declaration of Conduct in the South China Sea forged by the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations and China, under which all the parties agreed to exercise restraint and refrain from
occupying uninhabited areas, was being aggressively violated. And because all its complaints
have gone unheeded by Chinese authorities, the Philippines is now bringing the case to the
United Nations," (Naked Aggression, June 8).
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Apart from accusations of China's arrogance and imperious attitude, China was portrayed
as a threat to regional peace and security by the Philippine newspaper.
"China appears more willing now to use its strength and size to promote its interests, driven by
new domestic forces and reacting to explicit efforts by other big countries to secure their
superior position as maritime powers in the waters surrounding China," (Power Asymmetry in
West Philippine Sea, June 26).
Similarly, the Thanh Nien News charged China with "violation of international law",
"illegal attack", "provocative actions", and " threat of violence":
“China‟s harassment towards Vietnam and its violations of international regulations and normal
practices can cause discontent to any people of any country. China is acting aggressively but at
the same time accusing another country of being tough," (Chinese press distorting information,
threatening Vietnamese people, June 23).
"From the time of its first leadership, China has always thought about dominating the East Sea
(South China Sea). It has targeted that sooner or later it will take it; what matters is when. [...]It
is not only racing to develop military bases in the East Sea, but also deeply violating
the exclusive economic zones. Of course, China can‟t conduct its schemes immediately, but has
to escalate matters step by step towards the target. What they are doing is aimed at generating
publicity, turning an area without disputes into a disputed one, and illogically applying the “Ushaped” line (which has been added by China to its maps to claim to over 80 percent of the East
Sea," (China has always wanted the whole of East Sea, June 11)
The Vietnamese newspaper also upbraided China for its inconsistency in talks and
actions:
"China also made false claims that Vietnamese armed ships had chased away their fishing boats,
posing critical risks to Chinese fishermen‟s safety. Such actions and claims by China have been
considered as “carrying fire in one hand and water in the other,” (China has always wanted the
whole of East Sea, June 11).
Besides presenting China as the aggressor, the Thanh Nien News was found to have used
emotive language in its stories to create empathy for poor Vietnamese fishermen who were
captured by China in the disputed waters for ransoms.

"Hundreds of people, who are families and relatives of the seized fishermen, standing and sitting
on the beach, crying and praying for their loved ones to come back home safe and sound,"
(Vietnamese scholar discusses East Sea disputes on Chinese television, June 29).
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"[...] relatives built empty graves for the missing men – a traditional funeral practice for
fishermen who die at sea and whose bodies are not found. “After nearly four months of waiting, I
had to accept the truth that my father would never come back. It hurts and feels like my heart has
been stabbed and torn into hundreds of pieces. “It feels like I am living in another world – one of
sorrow, loneliness and unhappiness. I continue to fold paper cranes and boats, wanting to get
out of this world," (Fishermen pick up East Sea gauntlet, July 1)
On the Chinese front, data shows the Global Times put 33.3 percent (20 stories) of the
blame on the United States for the SCS conflicts' new tensions, followed by condemnations on
Vietnam (23.3%) and on the Philippines (12%).
While a sentiment of "who cares what the rivals say" seems to prevail among the Chinese
newspaper' stories, how China is seen by the conflicting parties and the international community
does really matter. This means discussions in the Global Times include ongoing references to
international media coverage, and to how China is seen by the world during the conflict. Simply
put, the newspaper's assigned task is to defeat "them all" in a war of words.
The Chinese newspaper framed the United States as the largest external power hampering
a peaceful settlement of the SCS issue and damaging regional peace and stability, commenting
that the Americans were masterminding discontent and resentment among the conflicting parties
as the United States seemed "to be the biggest winner from this discord," (US intervention in
South China Sea daft, June 14).

"The US also won't stand by idly in the region. Since the start of the 21st century, the US has
adjusted its global strategy, transferring its focus from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and gradually
gathering strategic resources in the West Pacific. The US aims for nothing but profit, and it will
use its balancing role for its own benefits,” (Dangerous nationalism risks future of South China
Sea, June 26).
The Chinese newspaper not only asserted that the U.S. involvement would complicate the
conflict, but also referred to it as "an attack on China" and a pre-planned "war game" (China
warns US off naval exercises, July 12). It criticized the United States for clinging to the "Cold
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War mentality" and thus always having to find an "enemy state" (China neither world power nor
shrinking violet, July 13). Therefore, its coverage sent a strong warning message to the United
States that some countries were actually "playing with fire" and the US should not let fire be
drawn to itself (China warns US over sea issue, June 23). Also, the newspaper urged China to
counter "the U.S. ploys".

"If US continued to take similar moves, keeps on selling weapons to Taiwan and refused to
abandon its intentionally established barriers and deeply harbored enmity to China on
international issues, fostering and advance Sino-US military relations could only be a wish and
fantasy as their insincerity might politically cripple the mutual trust [...] In the South China Sea,
the US has spoken of participating in "reconciling" the disputes among China, Vietnam, the
Philippines and others. There could be armed clashes if they stepped over China's bottom line.
Sovereignty disputes in Northeast Asia are historically unresolved problems. The regional
conflicts could be basically brought under control if the US did not meddle in local affairs. Only
regional and low-intensive armed conflicts would be possible, even if there were any.
Nevertheless, owing to the intervention of the US, some states might misjudge the situation and
overstep the line, resulting in war. China's military transparency is growing. Its independence
and confidence are more recognized. Developing friendly Sino-US military relations is best for
the region and the world. It would be unfortunate if US sticks to their Cold War logistic and
persists in establishing a number of realistic or potential rivals to China. In that case, global
peace, regional safety and Sino-US strategic interests cannot be guaranteed," (Political
impediments could knock Sino-US military relations, July 20).
Vietnam comes second in the blacklist of "aggressors" of the Global Times' coverage on
the conflict. The Chinese newspaper denied all the neighbor‟s claims that China was engaging in
"bullying actions", calling them "sheer fabrication" (China committed to safeguarding peace,
stability of South China Sea: spokesman, June 4), and shifted the allegations the other way
around. "Vietnam had endangered Chinese fishermen' lives” and was warned by Beijing to stop
"all invasive activities," (South China Sea tensions flare again as Vietnam announces naval drill
next week, June 11). It further strongly rebuked Vietnam for attempting to internationalize and
complicate the SCS issue.
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"Vietnam is the major advocate of inviting the US into the South China Sea as a "balance." Its
government is also consenting to a growing nationalistic sentiment among its people. Hanoi has
been setting a bad example in Southeast Asia," (China must react to Vietnam's provocation, June
21)
"Vietnam is trying to bring attention to Southeast Asia and portray China as a threatening rising
country in the region," (South China Sea tensions flare again as Vietnam announces naval drill
next week, June 11).
The Chinese newspaper accused Vietnam of inflaming the recent tensions, threatened that
"the biggest challenge of China's insistence on a peaceful solution is laid at Vietnam's door"
(China must react to Vietnam's provocation, June 21), and even raised a shrill voice calling for
war against its southern neighbor.
"The drill is undoubtedly intended as a military show of force toward China. [...] Through the
flexing of its muscle, Vietnam wants to demonstrate its resolution to maintain its claims on the
Nansha Islands," (Vietnam set for major naval drill, June 13).
"Depending on how the situation develops, China has to be ready for two plans: negotiate with
Vietnam for a peaceful solution, or answer the provocation with political, economic or even
military counterstrikes. We have to be clear about the possibility of the second option, so as to
let Vietnam remain sober about the South China Sea issue. China has to send a clear message
that it will take whatever measures necessary to protect its interests in the South China Sea. If
Vietnam continues to provoke China in this region, China will first deal with it with maritime
police forces, and if necessary, strike back with naval forces. China should clearly state that if it
decides to fight back, it will also take back the islands previously occupied by Vietnam. If
Vietnam wants to start a war, China has the confidence to destroy invading Vietnam battleships,
despite possible objections from the international community," (China must react to Vietnam's
provocation, June 21).
Apart from warning the United States to stay out of the deepening territorial spat in the
SCS and accusing Vietnam of provocation, the Global Times hit back strongly at the Philippines'
reprimands of its sovereignty violations, and "asked Manila to stop harming China's maritime
rights and interests" (Beijing rejects Manila accusations, June 8). It even challenged the
Philippines with provocative language:

"Clashing with neighboring countries is the last thing China wants. This is not out of timidity but
out of a desire to keep a harmonious environment. But if necessary, China will face the
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challenges head-on. The risk of an overall confrontation is bigger to neighboring countries.
There is little worry for China in breaking off relations with the Philippines. China holds
sovereignty over the Zhongye Dao Island, a fact the Philippines cannot change whatever
hardline approach it may resort to. If the Philippines think to gain an advantage by rocking the
boat, it may go right ahead," (The Philippines will not rock China's boat, July 21)
The Global Times also lobbied for military actions against both the Philippines and
Vietnam:
"These new possibilities prompted the dispatch of more troops and the development of the
modern dispute over the Nansha Islands. If China doesn't act to restrain Vietnam and the
Philippines by protecting its rights in the islands, it will have a harder time defending its rights
in the future. Vietnam and the Philippines have stirred up the present situation to achieve several
goals: As the oil resources in Nansha Islands are very rich, the two countries have real
economic interests at stake. They want to grasp the initiative in the South China Sea before the
Chinese military becomes more powerful. They also want to play the nationalist card to divert
the domestic public away from growing wealth gaps and official corruption in their home
countries," (Dangerous nationalism risks future of South China Sea, June 26)
As discussed in the first research question, although Vietnam and the Philippines have
overlapping claims, no news story criticizing each other was found in either the Thanh Nien
News or the Philippine Inquirer. On the opposite side of this news battle, The Thanh Nien News,
the Philippines Inquirer and the New York Times present what might be seen as a common front
against China-the "agressor". While Thanh Nien News ran stories about Chinese vessels cutting
exploration cable on a Vietnamese oil survey ship within Vietnam's exclusive economic zone
(Chinese ships violate Vietnam‟s sovereignty, disrupt oil exploration work, May 25),

the

Philippine Inquirer reported that the country's top military and defense officials discussed the
upgrading of military capacity and its president's announcement on sending the country's biggest
warship to conduct patrols in the SCS after claiming that Philippine would no longer be bullied
by China ( Top brass mull upgrades in contested territories, May 31). Similarly, the New York
Times ran headlines about hundreds of Vietnamese marching down the streets of Hanoi and Ho
Chi Minh City to protest against China's behavior (Dispute between Vietnam and China escalates
over competing claims in South China Sea, June 11).
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RQ7: Have the news media in the conflicting countries framed their reports around
extreme nationalism and conflict triggers rather than agreement? Out of the total 164
stories, 151 stories (92 percent) were framed by nationalist sentiments. The Philippine Inquirer
is found to be the most nationalistic newspaper among the four with 98 percent of its stories
having nationalistic elements, followed by the Global Times (95%), the Thanh Nien News (94%)
and the New York Times (50%).
Since Vietnam, China and Philippine see the SCS conflict as a rival quest for sovereignty,
all the three countries' newspapers quickly frame their stories to defend their "so-called
indisputable" sovereign rights, to protect their homeland, sea and islands.
The majority of the Philippine Inquirer's stories were found to echo its government‟s
tough line in defending the Philippines' territorial claims. The newspaper insisted on the
Philippines' undoubted possession of the disputed islands and reported that "the Filipino people
were prepared to defend their soil," (Spratly 5 go swimming in PAG-ASA, July 21).
"The President stated the Philippine case with little room for ambiguity: We do not wish to
increase tensions with anyone, but we must let the world know we are ready to protect what is
ours,"(Strong warning to China, July 27).
The newspaper also gave its support to the Philippines' attempts to protect its territorial
claims by all necessary means, even a military solution:
" In the strongest warning so far to China, President Aquino declared in his State of the Nation
Address on Monday that the Philippines is ready to defend its territorial claims in the South
China Sea (renamed West Philippine Sea) with beefed-up military forces," (Strong warning to
China, July 27).
“Of course, we will also fight, Ensign Conrado Arcellana, the island commander, replied when
asked what would happen if foreign invaders attacked," (Spratly 5 go swimming in PAG-ASA,
July 21).
"In Puerto Princesa City, Lt. Gen. Juancho Sabban told the Palawan provincial board that the
Armed Forces of the Philippines would take a defensive position if challenged by China. We will
fire only when fired upon. That is our rule of engagement, the Western Command chief said on
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Tuesday, reacting to questions from board members about Chinas reported plan to explore for
oil in the region," (PH pulls China markers, June 16).
"The new Philippine ambassador to Washington, Jose Cuisia Jr., has asked the defense
department in Manila to prepare an inventory of weapons to beef up the countrys military
capability. The weapons list is regarded as the first step in negotiating arms purchases from the
United States. I'm told that some of these weapons could at least sink Chinese vessels invading
Philippine structures in the area. Diplomatic settlement is still held as a priority over armed
action, but diplomacy also needs to be backed by gunsto be credible," (Spratlys row a test of PNoy mettle, June 13).
The nationalistic flame was also found burning in the coverage of the Global Times. It
employed an aggressive editorial style to push the Sino-centric view and promote Chinese
nationalism.

"It is wrong for countries in the region to try and use Washington's power to counter Beijing as
China will not make any concessions on its sovereignty," (Beijing rejects Manila accusations,
June 8).
"China didn't take measures to prevent others from playing dirty tricks or to lead to perform
good deeds to preserve the solemnity of the declaration. Preserving our sovereignty by economic
means is just one possible strategy. It doesn't mean that we exclude other strategies, including
military force, to protect our sovereignty," (Clear red line needed in South China Sea, June 19).
"China has to send a clear message that it will take whatever measures necessary to protect its
interests in the South China Sea. If Vietnam continues to provoke China in this region, China
will first deal with it with maritime police forces, and if necessary, strike back with naval forces.
China should clearly state that if it decides to fight back, it will also take back the islands
previously occupied by Vietnam. If Vietnam wants to start a war, China has the confidence to
destroy invading Vietnam battleships, despite possible objections from the international
community," (China must react to Vietnam's provocation, June 21)

The Chinese newspaper was also found to be more willing to adopt the viewpoint of
using the country's size and military strength to promote its interests in the dispute. It sent signals
that the relevant multinational companies and third parties, who wanted to participate in
exploring the area without China's agreement, were asking for trouble of their own making. It
even threatened that those attempting to support certain countries with military assistance and
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trying to gain profit through building alliances with some countries in the area could drag
themselves into a “mud pit”.
There was also a surge of nationalism directed at the "Chinese aggressiveness" on the
issue's coverage by the Thanh Nien News. It should be noted that the theme of patriotism and
anti-Chinese invaders has constituted a major part of the Vietnamese tradition and culture. "No
country in Southeast Asia is culturally closer to China than Vietnam, and no other country in the
region has spent so long fending off Chinese domination, often at a terrible cost in lives,
economic development and political compromise" (Forbes, 2007, para. 2). In other words, the
Sino-Vietnamese conflict is not news and the relationship between the two countries has been a
long history of mutual enmity. However, Vietnam also has an asymmetric relationship with its
northern neighbor. China is currently Vietnam's largest overall trade partner, which is the chief
source of its machinery, computers, chemicals and textiles. Vietnam‟s exports are mostly
commodities. Therefore, since Vietnam became more deeply embroiled deeper in the territorial
spat with China, the Vietnamese official media channels have usually avoided a tough
nationalistic line. The Thanh Nien News, yet, displayed a feverish anti-China sentiment on its
pages.
"The act of Chinese fishing and surveillance boats were totally intended, calculated, and wellprepared. It has critically violated Vietnam‟s sovereignty right and national jurisdiction,"
(Chinese ships cause disturbance in Vietnam‟s waters again, June 10)
"China‟s bullying acts and such editorials have destroyed good feelings of Vietnamese people
towards China. China‟s harassment towards Vietnam and its violations of international
regulations and normal practices can cause discontent to any people of any country. China is
acting aggressively but at the same time accusing another country of being tough (Chinese press
distorting information, threatening Vietnamese people, June 23)
"Vietnamese leaders have met with their Chinese counterparts many times to talk about the
arrests, but not all requirements were met. This time, China has demonstrated aggressive
actions, which prompted Vietnam to react in a similar way. There is nothing abnormal about
that," (Vietnamese scholar discusses East Sea disputes on Chinese television, June 29).
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Also, the newspaper referred to the conflict's new developments as “an occasion for the
people and army to once again "affirm our strongest determination to protect the nation‟s sacred
waters and islands, support activities to fight,"(Vietnam PM calls for sovereignty protection at
sea week, June 9). It reported that they -the Vietnamese- have love for their nation, the willpower
to not make concessions (Glaring at the shark, July 22), and if necessary, Vietnam would face
the challenges head-on.
Although the United States is not a claimant in the SCS conflict, the new developments
distressed the United States greatly because it related to China's military buildup and its
aggressiveness in the Asia-Pacific region, beyond the freedom of navigation issues. At the same
time, the Chinese widely believed that the U.S. government had taken a side against it and had
formed C-shape envelopment around China, and thus China has made clear its resentment
against the American re-engagement in Asia. Therefore, the New York Times, which seeks to
speak with a national voice, was found to promote the U.S. involvement as a guarantor of the
peace and to depict China as "the lone Asian power" that could pose threats to both the American
and regional security (U.S. Won‟t Become Isolationist, Gates Tells Worried Asian Leaders, June
3).
"Just as June 4 in Beijing ended many illusions about the nature of the Communist Party of
China, so events of the past year have stripped away many illusions about the country‟s
“peaceful rise. Whether or not this constitutes an “arms race,” there is plenty of reaction to
China‟s acquisition of missiles, stealth aircraft and a range of other sophisticated weapons,"
(China's Troubled Neighbors, June 7)
The New York Times noticed that the "Chinese are building what they call an entirely
defensive force, although one that includes weapons that exist primarily to strike American
military targets" (U.S. and China Try to Agree on Military Strategy, July 14), alarming about
"the prospect that new and disruptive technologies and weapons could be employed to deny U.S.
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forces access to key sea routes and lines of communications," (U.S. Won‟t Become Isolationist,
Gates Tells Worried Asian Leaders, June 3).
"Some American analysts say the two nations' moves and countermoves could doom any chance
for a true military and diplomatic accommodation. Others say the United States could be forced
into another arms race -- except that this time, unlike during the cold war, it would be China that
has billions to spend on new weapons and the United States that might be forced to choose
between guns and butter. China may be able to afford the missile, and the United States may be
able to build the ship and the defense system. But whether they are necessary might be another
matter. Said one American analyst, ''We're priming for a fight that I'm not sure either of us needs
or wants to have," (U.S. and China Try to Agree on Military Strategy, July 14).
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
As half of the world's merchant fleet by tonnage and oil tanker traffic sail through the
disputed waters every year, the SCS is a huge artery of global trade. If the simmering tensions
explode into full-fledged war, both the countries concerned and the international economy would
be dramatically shaken. Moreover, the major petroleum deposits believed to lie below the SCS's
seabed have turned the disputed sea into ground for a nascent but potential new cold war with
competing interests of the United States and China. Therefore, the SCS conflict is a regional
crisis that is becoming a flashpoint with global consequence, causing the upsurge in tensions
under study to have triggered both massive international media coverage as well as extensive
coverage in domestic media from the involved countries.
A turbulent situation contributed to the dominance of war journalism and
nationalistic sentiments in the coverage of the four newspapers under study. The complex web of
contentions among the two giants of China and the United States and the two small, vulnerable
countries of Vietnam and Philippines forms the background for the conflict. The United States
has claimed its national security interest in freedom of navigation in the SCS, and openly
supported a settlement of disputed claims by international law. It further announced that the
America's leadership was necessary to deal with the current challenges facing the Asia Pacific.
Such American assertions irked China, as it maintains that the disputes should be handled
bilaterally. For China, apart from obvious benefits from the resource-rich body of water, the SCS
conflict is additionally a matter of national pride. As such, China, emboldened by economic
growth as well as military advancement, started gearing up to challenge the United States‟
military presence in the region. Being small claimant states, Vietnam and the Philippines are
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uneasy but caught in a dilemma: to challenge the rising Chinese power or to protect what they
believe to be their sovereignty rights. The two countries have chosen to embrace an American
return to the region as a counter-Chinese approach. Also, China did help invite U.S. ire by
threatening these small neighboring countries.
The dominance of war-journalism elements demonstrate that in covering conflict events
which are perceived as a threat to the state or to core national security interests-such as was
perceived to be the case in the SCS conflict-these newspapers, as an interpretative community,
did not maintain a professional approach of objectivity and balance. Put another way, the
journalists' belonging to the national community can overshadow their membership in the
professional one.
In this study, these newspapers were found functioning in "a sphere of consensus" in
which commitment to balanced and objective coverage was sometimes set aside (Schudson,
2002, p. 40). Instead, these media professionals were seen to "invoke a generalized „we‟ and take
for granted shared values and assumptions" (Zandberg & Neiger, 2005, p. 138).
Theoretically, the New York Times should play the role of an international observer and
its coverage was expected to be less involved and more detached, as the United States is not a
claimant state in this territorial dispute. However, the findings suggested that warlike elements
and nationalism were as high in the American coverage as in the other three newspapers. This
supports the theoretical basis of the study, specifically the theory of information-gathering and
information-processing, which states that news outlets often find a way to tie their story back to
their home nation or region.
The comparative analysis also shows that most stories originated from official and elite
sources, which supports the aforementioned relationship between the state and the news media. It
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sheds light on how the mainstream media promote the nation's official views during multinational conflicts. The study further lends evidence for Niven (2004)‟s argument, which states
that when government officials and public opinion increasingly clash on a particular issue,
journalists are more likely to deviate from relying just on official sources. However, journalists
will be more likely not to seek an alternative viewpoint in international conflicts that evoke
strong feelings of patriotism or nationalism.
Within its limitations, this study offers a quantitative contribution to news framing in
conflict reporting, a topic that mostly receives qualitative discussions. Based on Galtung‟s (
1986, 1998) classification of war/peace journalism, along with Ting Lee and Maslog‟s (2005)
criteria for conflict reporting, the study investigates the framing of the SCS conflict by four
major English-language newspapers of the three most vocal conflicting parties and the major
world power involved. The news media in this study appeared to deem military options more
newsworthy than peace negotiations or efforts at etablishing legitmate boundaries through multinational talks or promoting the adoption of a code of conduct in the conflict waters. In fact, the
four newspapers tended to use war frames, even though they could report peace negotiations. In
other words, these news outlets had a strong tendency to put their focus on military actions and
subsequent responses from the involved governments and armies rather than on long-term,
peaceful solutions to the dispute.
All four newspapers that were studied were found to be event-oriented or crisis-oriented.
During the peak of tension, both story length and variety of story types (news, feature, opinions)
involving the SCS conflict increased. Both story length and story type have a significant
relationship with distribution of war journalism indicators. The longer the story, the more likely
it has more war journalism indicators. Similarly, there is a large difference in distribution of war
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journalism indicators in hard-news, feature stories and opinion pieces. Opinion pieces tend to
have the most war journalism indicators, followed by features and hard news, respectively. It is
conceivable that longer stories allow journalists time to investigate an issue more fully and
thoughtfully. Yet, this also permits journalists to move beyond reporting objective facts into
personal analysis and opinions.
China, the Philippines, and Vietnam, embroiled in a decades-old territorial dispute over
the SCS, have demonstrated through their major newspapers that media continue to adopt an
aggressive, war-oriented coverage of conflicts, putting emphasis mainly on the differences
leading to the dispute, with little consideration for common benefits. Their coverage largely
reflects and supports justifications for their country's foreign policy in the SCS conflict.
Moreover, the technique of good/bad tagging was used widely to blame one another. Specific
types of war-journalism framing devices such as victimizing, demonizing language, military
vocabulary, and emotive, are found to appear on a frequent basis.
Although the strongest war journalism framing by the Chinese newspaper is not
unexpected, it is surprising to find the war-oriented frame similarly prevailed in the American
newspaper. One explanation is that stories by Western news agencies tend to report violence and
conflict more saliently than any other news stories from developing countries (Hachten, 1999;
Hess, 1996). The findings lend support to Hess‟s (1996) argument that the actions of foreign
governments, when related to violence and conflict, have the greatest chance of getting reported
by the American media.
Context has proved to have strongly influenced the reporting and selection of news
framing by the Chinese, Vietnamese and Philippine newspapers. The conflict among the three
countries runs deep. Nationalist sentiment also swept through all three countries following the
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naval skirmishes. Both Philippine and Vietnamese protesters were seen marching down the
streets, gathering in front of the Chinese Embassy and shouting "Down with China" in Hanoi,
Manila and other major cities world-wide in June and July, 2011. In China, there was also a
surge of nationalism, mostly directed at the United States and Vietnam. It is likely that the news
media not only reflected their government‟s stands, but also shifted from the professional
standards of objective journalism to war journalism framing to reflect their country's viewpoint.
On the whole, the study indicates that the news media of the involved countries reduced
their own autonomy as an independent third party in times of conflicts or wars. It suggests that
media outlets tend to reflect the stances of their respective governments or people, and warjournalism was the defining and dominating frame in news coverage of the recent development
of the SCS conflict. War journalism defines the terms of debate, influences public and media
discourse within its framework, and thus shapes much foreign and domestic policy. The Chinese
newspaper, the Global Times, was most likely to carry propaganda-oriented and biased articles,
framed around a hard-line nationalistic view. The American, Vietnamese and Philippine
newspapers are also found to have promoted a war-journalism frame in their coverage, and sided
with their country‟s perceived national interest. Yet, they still manage to maintain a level of
journalistic independence and objectivity amidst a surge of patriotism and national loyalty.
The study demonstrates that journalists face an extremely difficult challenge in reporting
on an armed conflict that affects their own people. These newspapers gave priority to the
national components during the conflict. The ability to see how "the enemies" picture us in time
of international conflict, to present all conflicting parties as accountable for the conflict and call
them all to take responsibility, is vital for gaining this critical distance.
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The purpose of this study is not to criticize the involved newspapers. Rather, it hopes to
promote the view that responsible coverage of the conflict situation could play a decisive role in
preventing any further escalation. Since there is no realistic prospect of a settlement in the near
future and nationalism has already surged on all sides of the conflict, misleading information and
aggressive reports will only worsen the conflict scenario. In summary, the study suggests that the
involved media should add „s‟ for solutions, and „c” for „common ground‟ to the traditional five
“Ws” formula.
Limitations and Future Research
Although the study was carefully prepared and conducted, there are still many
unavoidable limitations and shortcomings. Since the assessment of the data was conducted by the
author herself, it is unavoidable that her own Vietnamese cultural background might result in a
certain degree of subjectivity. All the data came from coding done only by the author.
Consequently, data is only speculative since unintended bias may have intruded. The present
study was also limited by its analysis of English-language Asian daily newspapers. It is
recommended that future researchers should do an analysis with additional coders assessing the
reliability of the coding scheme being used. Also, future research should consider the vernacular
press rather than only English-language media.
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Appendix A

13 Indicators of War Journalism by Ting Lee and Maslog (2005)

Approach
1

Reactivity: waits for war to break out, or about to break out, before reporting. Recent
interest in the SCS conflict only began when armed clashes and naval skirmishes were
imminent. Coverage is dominated by updates of the escalating tensions among the
conflicting parties. There are reports on peace negotiations, but that frame is not reinforced
as much as the war frame.

2

Visibility of effects of war: Reports mainly on visible effects of war (causalities, dead and
wounded, damaged to property). For example, reports on the SCS conflict count the number
of fishermen and/or fishing boats captured by conflicting countries (i.e., China, Vietnam,
and the Philippines) as they fished in waters around the islands under dispute. In Galtung
(1986)‟s terms, this focus in on direct violence.

3

Elite-orientation: Focuses on leaders and elites as primary actors and sources of information.
The voices that have received the most coverage in the SCS conflict have been political
leaders (e.g., foreign ministers, prime ministers, presidents, etc.,) and/or military officials
(e.g., defense secretaries, generals, etc.). Other voices such as normal people, sailors or
fishermen are not seriously entertained in the mainstream media. For example: “In the
strongest warning so far to China, President Aquino declared in his State of the Nation
Address on Monday that the Philippines is ready to defend its territorial claims in the South
China Sea (renamed West Philippine Sea) with beefed-up military forces” (The Philippine
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Inquirer (2011, July 27). Strong warning to China).
4

Differences: Focus mainly on differences among the countries that led to the conflict. In the
SCS conflict, the disputed water has long been analogous to land. Therefore, the delineation
of maritime zones in this conflict has thus been discussed with the same terms as those used
for delineating land borders. For example, “„We continue to affirm strongly and to manifest
the strongest determination of all the Party, of all the people and of all the army to protect
Vietnamese sovereignty in maritime zones and islands of the country,‟ Prime Minister
Nguyen Tan Dung said on Thursday,” (Thanh Nien News (2011, June 9). Vietnam PM calls
for sovereignty protection at sea week).

5

Focus mainly on the here and now: News stories focus mostly on visible effect of violence
(e.g., casualties, death, wounded, material damage, etc.). For example, “Back in Vietnam,
several fishing families have seen their relatives never return from trips to Hoang Sa, with
some blaming the disappearances on Chinese bandits,” (Thanh Nien News (2011, July 22).
Glaring at the shark) or “Vietnam protested to China on Thursday after three Chinese boats
“deliberately” harassed an exploration ship in Vietnam‟s waters in the East Sea,” (Thanh
Nien News (2011, June 9). Vietnam demands China to stop harassing ships).

6

Good and bad dichotomy: Dichotomizes between the “good guys” and “bad guys”, victims
and villains. For example, “Tensions between the Philippines and China have risen recently
because of incidents like the Chinese allegedly firing on Filipino fishermen, Chinese vessels
harassing a Filipino oil exploration ship, and the building of structures in unoccupied islets
claimed by the Philippines,” (The Philippines Inquirer (2011, July 21). Spratly 5 go
swimming in PAG-ASA).

7

Party involvement: Two-party orientation in which one party wins, one party loses. For
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example, “It is wrong for countries in the region to try and use Washington's power to
counter Beijing as China will not make any concessions on its sovereignty,” (Global Times
(2011, June 8). Beijing rejects Manila accusations).
8

Partisanship: biased for one side in the conflict. For example, “But unlike the US' ultimate
goal of hampering China and driving it further away from the Pacific, China's military
strength is aimed at restoring the validity of the Yalta System to what it ought to be and with
this China's rightful claim of Taiwan. Such claims are rational and reasonable and have a
bright future ahead,” (Global Times (2011, June 9). Oceanic strategy not aimed at US
interests)

9

Winning orientation: Zero-sum orientation with the ultimate goal of winning. For example,
“The new Philippine ambassador to Washington, Jose Cuisia Jr., has asked the defense
department in Manila to prepare an inventory of weapons to beef up the countrys military
capability. The weapons list is regarded as the first step in negotiating arms purchases from
the United States. I‟m told that some of these weapons could at least sink Chinese vessels
invading Philippine structures in the area. Diplomatic settlement is still held as a priority
over armed action, but diplomacy also needs to be backed by guns to be credible,” (The
Philippines Inquirer (2011, June 13). Spratlys row a test of President Aquino mettle).

10

Continuity of reports: journalists stop reporting when there is a peace treaty signing and/or
ceasefire and head for another war elsewhere
Language

11 Uses victimizing language that emphasize casualties, suffering, and displacement (e.g., the
pain of loss, impoverished, arrested and bullied by China's policies, being detained and
beaten, etc.)
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12 Demonizing: Uses demonizing language (e.g., vicious, cruel, brutal, barbaric,
inhuman...etc.,) to demonize the enemy, while humanizing the participants on “our side”.
For example, “China will become the threat it will not only become the giant but it will
become the monster, Widjajanto, also one of the members of a team that reviewed the
Indonesian National Defense System, said” (Philippines Inquirer (2011, July 15). China will
become ruthless monster, says Indon expert).
13 Uses emotive words to create emotional effects of war journalism by taking advantages of
audiences‟ feelings resulting from the conflict such as hopelessness and powerlessness,
anxiety, mood disturbance, sadness and a sense of insecurity with physical and social
environment. For example, “It feels like I am living in another world – one of sorrow,
loneliness and unhappiness. I continue to fold paper cranes and boats, wanting to get out of
this world,” (Thanh Nien News (2011, July 1). Fishermen pick up East Sea gauntlet).
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Appendix B
Coding Variables and Categories
___________________________________________________________________________
War Journalism Indicators
1. Emphasis on political elite and official sources (e.g., foreign ministers, prime ministers,
presidents, defense secretaries, generals, etc.). Story is quoted either directly or indirectly
from them. For example, “Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates pledged Saturday that the
United States would sustain its military presence and diplomatic involvement in Asia, as
he sought to calm regional worries about the potential for a new isolationism brought on
by fiscal difficulties at home,” (The New York Times. (June 4, 2011). U.S. Won't
Become Isolationist, Gates Tells Worried Asian Leaders).
2. Conflict outcomes focused on war options: if a story leads its audiences to overvalue
violent responses to this conflict and ignore peaceful alternatives (e.g., word choices,
attitudes, etc.). For example, “Depending on how the situation develops, China has to be
ready for two plans: negotiate with Vietnam for a peaceful solution, or answer the
provocation with political, economic or even military counterstrikes,” (The Global Times
(2011, June 21). China must react to Vietnam's provocation).
3. Focus mainly on differences that led to the conflict: to find out whether a story delving
into major differences that lead to disputes among the conflicting parties or promoting
similarities, common interests or peaceful negotiations. For example, “…urges Vietnam
to avoid encroaching upon China's territorial sovereignty,” (The Global Times (2011,
June 21). China must react to Vietnam's provocation).

97

4. Frequent good/bad tagging: evidenced by condemning languages and attitudes (e.g.,
aggressor, big bully, aggressive actions, encroachments, etc.)
5. Partisanship: biased for one side in the conflict: examining if a story has its value bias
towards only one country in the SCS conflict, ignoring or concealing initiatives from the
other side or third parties. For example, “Reaffirmed „the incontestable maritime
sovereignty of Vietnam towards the two archipelagos, the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa‟,
which the people and army have "the strongest determination" to protect”.
6. Zero-sum victory-defeat orientation: promotes belief that winning is the ultimate goal and
this orientation assumes that one side‟s needs only be met by the other side‟s compromise
or defeat. For example, “Certain countries think that China will continue to tolerate and
yield like before, and they stealthily explore and develop on some islands. Such
things happened before, but cannot happen today and will not occur in the future,”
(Global Times (2011, June 16). Joint development only way out of island issues)
7. Victimizing language (e.g., dirty tricks, the pain of loss, impoverished, arrested and
bullied by China's policies, being detained and beaten, etc.)
8. Military vocabulary. For example, “The 378-foot Hamilton-class cutter is a
decommissioned United States Coast Guard patrol vessel that the Philippines was able to
acquire under the United States Excess Defense Act,” (The Philippines Inquirer (2011,
July 17) PH navy acquires biggest warship)
9. Demonizing language (e.g., clear violations, harassing acts, etc.)
10. Emotive words (e.g., crying rape, unchecked aggressive, naked ambitions, etc.).
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Appendix C
News Categories: All Four Newspapers

Hard news

Feature

Opinion

Stories

stories

pieces (Op-

Others

Sources

Total

Daily Quote:

Xinhua (10)

60

AP

36

Ed)

The Global

26

14

16

Times

02
Picture
Gallery: 01
Voices: 01

Thanh Nien

17

13

6

News

AFP
Reuters
VNA

The

21

19

9

Philippines

Talk Around

The

Town: 01

Philippines

Inquirer

New York

50

Inquirer

8

6

3

Times

99

Letter to the

AP

Editor: 01

NYT

18

Appendix D
Total Data Analysis

Yes

No

Total

War-journalism
Indicator

1

Emphasis on elite

No. of

Percentage

No. of

Percentage

No. of

Percentage

Articles

%

Articles

%

Articles

%

145

88.4

19

11.6

164

100

63

38.4

101

61.6

164

100

131

79.9

33

20.1

164

100

107

65.2

57

34.8

164

100

143

87.2

21

12.8

164

100

and official
sources
2

Conflict outcomes
focused

on

war

options.
3

Focus mainly
differences that
led to the conflict

4

Frequent good/bad
tagging.

5

Partisanship:
biased for one side
in the conflict

100

6

Zero-sum victory-

50

30.5

114

69.5

164

100

14

8.5

150

91.5

164

100

61

37.1

103

62.9

164

100

72

43.9

92

56.1

164

100

26

15.9

138

84.1

164

100

defeat orientation.
7

Victimizing
language

8

Military
vocabulary

9

Uses demonizing
language

10 Uses emotive
words
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Appendix E
The Global Times Data Analysis

Yes

No

Total

War-journalism Indicator
No. of

1

Emphasis on elite

Percentage No. of

Percentage

No. of

Percentage

Articles

%

Articles

%

Articles

%

51

85

9

15

60

100

24

40

36

60

60

100

52

86.7

8

13.3

60

100

44

73.3

16

26.7

60

100

59

98.3

1

1.7

60

100

39

65

21

35

60

100

and official sources
2

Conflict

outcomes

focused

on

war

options.
3

Focus mainly
differences that led
to the conflict

4

Frequent

good/bad

tagging.
5

Partisanship: biased
for one side in the
conflict

6

Zero-sum victory-
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defeat orientation.
7

Victimizing

0

0

60

100

60

100

language
8

Military vocabulary

22

36.7

38

63.3

60

100

9

Uses demonizing

21

35

39

65

60

100

2

3.3

58

96.7

60

100

language
10

Uses emotive words

103

104

Appendix F
The Philippines Inquirer Data Analysis

Yes

No

Total

War-journalism Indicator

1

Emphasis on elite and

No. of

Percentage

No. of

Percentage

No. of

Percentage

Articles

%

Articles

%

Articles

%

47

94

3

6

50

100

21

42

29

58

50

100

35

70

15

30

50

100

27

54

23

46

50

100

42

84

8

16

50

100

0

0

50

100

50

100

official sources
2

Conflict
focused

outcomes
on

war

options.
3

Focus mainly
differences that led to
the conflict

4

Frequent

good/bad

tagging.
5

Partisanship: biased
for one side in the
conflict

6

Zero-sum victory-
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defeat orientation.
7

Victimizing language

5

10

45

90

50

100

8

Military vocabulary

19

38

31

62

50

100

9

Uses demonizing

27

54

23

46

50

100

6

12

44

88

50

100

language
10 Uses emotive words

106

107

Appendix G
Thanh Nien News Data Analysis

War-journalism Indicator

1

Yes

No

Total

No. of

Percentage

No. of

Percentage

No. of

Percentage

Articles

%

Articles

%

Articles

%

31

86.12

5

13.88

36

100

6

16.7

30

83.3

36

100

29

80.6

7

19.4

36

100

good/bad

26

72.3

10

27.7

36

100

Partisanship: biased for

33

91.6

3

8.4

36

100

0

0

36

100

36

100

Emphasis on elite and
official sources

2

Conflict
focused

outcomes
on

war

options.
3

Focus mainly
differences that led to
the conflict

4

Frequent
tagging.

5

one side in the conflict
6

Zero-sum victorydefeat orientation.
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7

Victimizing language

9

(25

27

75

36

100

8

Military vocabulary

10

27.8

26

72.2

36

100

9

Uses demonizing

16

44.4

20

55.6

36

100

11

30.6

25

69.4

36

100

language
10 Uses emotive words

109

110

Appendix H
The New York Times Data Analysis

Yes

No

Total

War-journalism Indicator
No. of

No. of

Percentage

No. of

Percentage

%

Articles

%

Articles

%

16

88.9

2

11.1

18

100

12

66.7

6

33

18

100

15

83.4

3

16.6

18

100

good/bad

10

55.6

8

44.4

18

100

Partisanship: biased for

9

50

9

50

18

100

11

61

7

39

18

100

Articles

1

Emphasis on elite

Percentage

and official sources
2

Conflict

outcomes

focused on war options.
3

Focus mainly
differences that led to
the conflict

4

Frequent
tagging.

5

one side in the conflict
6

Zero-sum victorydefeat orientation.
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7

Victimizing language

0

0

18

100

18

100

8

Military vocabulary

10

55.6

8

44.4

18

100

9

Uses demonizing

8

44.4

10

55.6

18

100

7

39

11

61

18

100

language
10 Uses emotive words

112
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THANH NIEN NEWS (VIETNAM)

1.

Asian navies seek closer ties amid sea spat (7/27/2011).

2.

Glaring at the shark (7/24/2011).

3.

US warns on East Sea, welcomes Korea talks (7/23/2011).

4.

Experts doubt new agreement will ease East Sea tension (7/22/2011).

5.

PetroVietnam ties with Vietnam military firm on ammonia project (7/21/2011)

6.

Vietnam to host ASEAN naval meeting, highlight East Sea issues (7/19/2011)

7.

ASEAN-China agree on East Sea guidelines (7/20/2011)

8.

Petrovietnam Insurance says in stake sale talks (7/13/2011)

9.

Vietnam Petrolimex plans refinery; pipeline for Chinese fuel (7/12/2011)

10.

Vietnam maritime police to recejve new boats, planes (7/8/2011)

11.

East Sea disputes need to be controlled, scholar says (7/3/2011)

12.

Vietnamese scholar discusses East Sea disputes on Chinese television (6/29/2011)

13.

Fishermen pick up East Sea gauntlet (7/1/2011)

14.

ASEAN members call for peaceful resolution of East Sea issues (6/30/2011)

15.

US, China butt heads over East Sea disputes (6/24/2011)
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16.

Chinese press distorting information, threatening Vietnamese people (6/23/2011) 17.
Vietnam, US in joint peace call in South China Sea (6/17/2011)

18.

Int‟l experts get behind Vietnam in East Sea dispute (6/18/2011 )

19.

Vietnam demands China to stop harassing ships (6/9/2011)

20

Chinese ships cause disturbance in Vietnam‟s waters again (6/10/2011)

21.

China has always wanted the whole of East Sea (6/11/2011)

22.

Vietnam brings up East Sea issues at Asia-Europe‟s meeting (6/9/2011)

23.

Vietnam PM calls for sovereignty protection at sea week (6/9/2011)

24.

East Sea undercurrents (6/10/2011)

25.

Vietnam insists on peaceful measures for East Sea issues: defense official (6/5/2011)

26.

Oil exploration vessel sails again (6/6/2011)

27.

Vietnam promotes peaceful policies at Asia-Pacific security forum (6/6/2011)

28.

Maritime experts cry foul on China (6/3/2011)

29.

Vietnamese expert stresses China‟s expansion ambition in latest sea clash (6/1/2011)

30.

Vietnam condemns China for East Sea aggression (5/31/2011)

31.

Vietnam should file lawsuit against China for sea violation: expert (5/30/2011)
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32.

Fishermen vow to defend Vietnamese fishing grounds

33

Vietnam condemns China in latest sovereignty violation (30/5/11)

34

Chinese fishing boats violate Vietnam waters; gov't mulls patrol boats (29/5/11) 35
Chinese ships violate Vietnam‟s sovereignty, disrupt oil exploration work (27/5/11)

36.

Dear to Vietnamese heart
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GLOBAL TIMES (CHINA)

1.

Beijing rebuffs Hanoi offshore oil, gas claims (May 30, 2011)

2.

China opposes Vietnam oil, gas exploration in China's jurisdictional sea area (May 29,

2011)

3.

Experts dismiss Filipino maritime concerns (June 02, 2011)

4.

China committed to safeguarding peace, stability of South China Sea: spokesman (June

04, 2011)

5.

Chinese FM says any attempt to complicate South China Sea issue meet interests of none

(June 07, 2011)

6.

Vietnam protest damages ties (June 07 2011)

7.

Beijing rejects Manila accusations (June 08 2011)

8.

China can help guard lifeline through Strait of Malacca (June 09 2011)

9.

Keep threats out of the South China Sea - Editorial (Jun 9, 2011)

10.

Oceanic strategy not aimed at US interests (June 09 2011)

11.

China denies Vietnam's accusation on South China Sea (Jun 10, 2011)
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12.

South China Sea tensions flare again as Vietnam announces naval drill next week (June

11, 2011)

13.

Vietnam set for major naval drill (June 13, 2011)

14.

Narrow interests limit SCO's influence (June 13 2011)

15.

US intervention in South China Sea daft (June 14, 2011)

16.

Vietnam urged to act responsibly over tensions (June 14, 2011)

17.

Keep Sea issue simple, says Beijing (June 15, 2011)

18.

Joint development only way out of island issues (June 15, 2011)

19.

Beijing warns against complicating South China Sea issue (June 15, 2011)

20.

Picturesque scenery of Xisha Islands in South China Sea (June 17, 2011)

21.

Beijing OKs role of Taiwan in spat (June 17, 2011)

22.

PLA holds three-day exercise as tensions continue in S. China Sea (June 18, 2011)

23.

Clear red line needed in South China Sea (June 19, 2011)

24.

Public want tough line in S. China Sea (June 20, 2011)

25.

Vietnam 'upsets' Chinese public (June 21, 2011)

26.

Turbulent sea disputes not set to calm soon (Jun 21, 2011)
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27.

China must react to Vietnam's provocation (June 21, 2011)

28.

China refutes Philippines' accusation over S China Sea issue (July 23, 2011)

29.

China warns US over sea issue (June 23, 2011)

30.

China warns off Japan-US alliance (June 24, 2011)

31.

US, Vietnam hold military drills in South China Sea (June 25, 2011)

32.

Dangerous nationalism risks future of South China Sea (Jun 26, 2011)

33.

China, Vietnam agree to resolve maritime dispute through negotiations (June 26, 2011)

34.

China, Vietnam to ease sea tension (June 27, 2011)

35.

US, Philippines start joint naval exercise (June 29, 2011)

36.

China has indisputable sovereignty over South China Sea islands: spokesman (June 29,

2011)

37.

Chinese sub to delve 5,000 meters under Pacific Ocean (July 02, 2011)

38.

Japan FM visits Beijing (July 04, 2011)

39.

War's legacy still tints Vietnam's view of US (July 06, 2011)

40.

Manila accuses 'rude' diplomat (July 07, 2011)

41.

US walking a tightrope over South China Sea issues (July 07, 2011)
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42.

China Not to Restrict Navigation in S.China Sea (July 08, 2011)

43.

Philippines, China reach consensus (July 09, 2011)

44.

China warns US off naval exercises (July 12, 2011)

45.

China neither world power nor shrinking violet (July 13, 2011)

46.

Voices on the management of the conflict over the South China Sea (July 13, 2011)

47.

China rejects Manila's plan to bring spat to UN tribunal (July 14, 2011)

48.

South China Sea rows require direct negotiations: Foreign Ministry (July 15, 2011)

49.

Deep ambitions (July 15, 2011)

50.

Hanoi breaks up anti-China rally (July 18, 2011)

51.

ASEAN to finalize South China Sea guidelines (July 19, 2011)

52.

Beijing blasts Manila ahead of ASEAN talks (July 20, 2011)

53.

Political impediments could knock Sino-US military relations (July 20, 2011)

54.

ASEAN and China can't split over South China Sea (July 20, 2011)

55.

The Philippines will not rock China's boat (July 21, 2011)

56.

Sea row guidelines agreed (July 21, 2011)

57.

China, ASEAN talk peace (July 22, 2011)
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58.

New guidelines on South China Sea give green light for China-ASEAN cooperation (July

23, 2011)

59.

Chinese FM meets with US Secretary of State Clinton in Bali, Indonesia (July 23, 2011)

60.

US calls for proof in South China Sea claims (July 25, 2011)
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THE PHILIPPINES INQUIRER (PHILIPPINES)
1. Strong Warning To China (July 27, 2011)
2. The Spratlys (July 25, 2011)
3. DND Chief Accuses China of Double Talk (July 23, 2011)
4. Flag Waving In The Spratlys
5. Kalayaan Tourists Spot 2 Ships Destroying Coral Reefs (July 22, 2011)
6. Good, Bad News From ASEAN Meeting, Says DFA Chief (July 21, 2011)
7. Spratly 5 Go Swimming In PAG-ASA (July 21, 2011)
8. No Baon For Spratlys 5; Trip Not Official (July 20, 2011)
9. Mischief Reef And Love Me Tender (July 18, 2011)
10. US Lawmakers Back PH In Dispute Over Spratlys (July 18, 2011)
11. PH Navy Acquires Biggest Warship (July 17, 2011)
12. China Will Become Ruthless Monster, Says Indon Expert (July 15, 2011)
13. Despite spat, PH Upbeat On Relations With China (July 15, 2011)
14. PH Fails To Get China Assurance on Intrusions (July 12, 2011)
15. Del Rosario Off To China (July 7, 2011)
16. PINOY Reds Rap China, US, PH over Spratlys (July 6, 2011)
17. US Assures PH Youve Got a Friend (July 4, 2011)
18. PH Correctly Stand Its (Maritime) Ground (June 30, 2011)
19. Dealing With the New China (June 30, 2011)
20. China's Worst-Kept Secret Naval Weapon (June 29, 2011)
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21. PH-US Defense Pact Doesnt Apply in Spratlys Dispute, Says Ex-up Law Dean (June 29,
2011)
22. Common Use in the Spartlys (June 28, 2011)
23. China Creates Waves in Naval Show of Force (June 27, 2011)
24. Honasan Not Impressed with US Pledge of Help (June 27, 2011)
25. PAF To Get P14-B Funding To Acquire Aircraft (27, 2011)
26. Power Asymmetry in West Philippine Sea (June 26, 2011)
27. Long Delayed Repair of PAG-ASA Airstrip to Start Anytime Now (June 23, 2011)
28. PH Pulls China Markers (June 16, 2011)
29. Revival of Spratlys Oil Deal Pushed (June 16, 2011)
30. House Backs Rules-Based Approach to West Philippine Sea (June 15, 2011)
31. Pursue Diplomacy over Troubled Waters (June 15, 2011)
32. Name Game PH Now Calls Spratly Isle Recto Bank (June 14, 2011)
33. Spratlys Row a Test of P-NOY Mettle (June 13, 2011)
34. Embassy Official Clarifies Statement (June 13, 2011)
35. PAGASA Follows Palace Lead, Adopts West Philippine Sea (June 13, 2011)
36. Palace Says US Will Side with PH in China Conflict (June 13, 2011)
37. US Not Coming to PH Aid vs China (June 12, 2011)
38. It's West Philippine Sea (June 11, 2011)
39. P-NOY To Raise Spratlys Row in State Visit to Beijing (June 10, 2011)
40. Naked Aggression (June 8, 2011)
41. Gazmin China to Lose Face with Incursions (June 8, 2011)
42. PH Pushes Rules-based Approach (June 7, 2011)
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43. Manilas Claim in Spratlys within West Philippine Sea (June 6, 2011)
44. Drilon Says PH Cant Go On Arms Race with China (June 6, 2011)
45. GOVT Shop for US Arms (June 5, 2011)
46. Endangered Wildlife Collateral Damage in Spratlys Row (June 3, 2011)
47. Spratlys Top Agenda of Brunei Visit (June 2, 2011)
48. PH Govt Files Protest vs China Intrusion (June 2, 2011)
49. Top Brass Mull Upgrades in Contested Territories (May 31, 2011)
50. Another Sino Official Assures PH on Spratlys (May 29, 2011)
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THE NEW YORK TIMES (THE UNITED STATES)

1.

U.S. Won't Become Isolationist, Gates Tells Worried Asian Leaders (June 4, 2011)

2.

China's Troubled Neighbors (June 7, 2011)

3.

China: Neighbors Warned on Disputed Island Chain (June 10, 2011)

4.

Tensions grow in SCS: Vietnam to hold naval exercises (June 11)

5.

Dispute Between Vietnam and China Escalates Over Competing Claims in South
China Sea (June 11, 2011)

6.

China Navy Reaches Far, Unsettling The Region (June 15, 2011)

7.

How China Behaves (June 17, 2011)

8.

China: Maritime Patrols on the Rise (June 18, 2011)

9.

Beijing Warns U.S. About South China Sea Disputes (June 23, 2011)

10.

China and Vietnam Agree to Talks on South China Sea Dispute (June 27, 2011)

11.

Joint Chiefs Chairman Meets With Chinese Counterpart (July 11, 2011)

12.

Military Leaders of U.S. and China Vow Closer Ties, but Bumps Remain (July 12,
2011)

13.

Counterpoint: Don‟t Write Off the U.S. (July 15, 2011)

14.

Wary Rivals, U.S. and China Try to Reach Truce on Military Strategy (July 15, 2011)

15.

Vietnam: U.S. Ships to Join Exercises, Raising Objections from China (July 16,
2011)

16.

US and China Try to agree on military strategy (July 17, 2011)

17.

A Step Toward Trust With China (July 26, 2011)

18.

Clinton Urges Broad Pact Among Asian Nations (July 26, 2011)
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